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Section 704(b)(2) - The Back Door
into Chapter 7 for the Above-
Median Debtor
by
Laura B. Bartell*
In 2005, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Con-
sumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA),1 which made extensive changes to
the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code2 governing chapter 7 bankruptcies
filed by individual debtors. Most significant were modifications to § 707(b),
a section which allows the court, "on its own motion or on a motion by the
United States trustee, trustee (or bankruptcy administrator, if any), or any
party in interest" 3 to dismiss a chapter 7 bankruptcy case "filed by an individ-
ual debtor.., whose debts are primarily consumer debts" 4 if the granting of
relief under chapter 7 "would be an abuse of the provisions of [chapter 7]."5
In applying the standard of abuse, Congress inserted new language (often
called the "means-testing" provision 6) that requires that "the court shall pre-
sume abuse exists" 7 if the debtor's "current monthly income" (as defined in
§ 101(10A) of the Codes) reduced by certain specified monthly expenses 9
*Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. My thanks to Beth Applebaum for her
assistance on this article.
'Bankruptcy Abuse Protection and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23
(2005).
211 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2006).
311 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (Supp. 2016).41d. Alternatively, the court may, with the consent of the debtor, convert the case to one under
chapter 11 or 13. See id.51d.
6See, e.g., Luke Welmerink, Cleaning the Mess of the Means Test: The Need for a Case-by-Case
Analysis of 4 01(k) Loans in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petitions, 41 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 121, 123 n.15
(2010); Robert J. Landry, III, The Means Test: Finding a Safe Harbor, Passing the Means Test, or Rebut-
ting the Presumption of Abuse May Not Be Enough, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 245, 248 n.16 (2009); Ned W.
Waxman & Justin H. Rucki, Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Abuse: Means Testing is Presumptive, but 'Totality-
is Determinative, 45 HOUSTON L. REv. 901, 903 (2008); Charles J. Tabb & Jillian K. McClelland, Living
with the Means Test, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 463, 464 (2007); Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New
§ 707(b), 79 Am. BA-KR. L.J. 231, 231 (2005).
711 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 2016).
SSection 101(10A) states that "current monthly income" -
(A) means the average monthly income from all sources that the debtor receives (or
in a joint case the debtor and the debtor's spouse receive) without regard to
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and multiplied by sixty 10 is not less than certain dollar amounts specified in
the legislation." A motion based on the presumption of abuse may be
brought only against an above-median debtor. If the "current monthly in-
come of the debtor. . and the debtor's spouse combined, as of the date of the
order for relief, when multiplied by 12, is equal to or less than"' 2 the median
family income of the applicable state for a family of the same size as the
debtor's family, neither the judge, United States trustee (or bankruptcy ad-
ministrator, if any), 13 trustee, or other party in interest may file a motion to
dismiss based on the presumption of abuse.' 4
In order to alert the court and all parties in interest to potential cases of
abuse, the United States trustee is required by § 704(b)(1) to "review all
materials filed by the [individual] debtor and, not later than 10 days after the
whether such income is taxable income, derived during the 6-month period ending
on-
(i) the last day of the calendar month immediately preceding the date of the
commencement of the case if the debtor files the schedule of current income
required by section 521(aXl)(B)(ii); or
(ii) the date on which current income is determined by the court for purposes of
this title if the debtor does not file the schedule of current income required by
section 521(a)(1XB)(ii); and
(B) includes any amount paid by any entity other than the debtor (or in a joint case
the debtor and the debtor's spouse), on a regular basis for the household expenses of
the debtor or the debtor's dependents (and in a joint case the debtor's spouse if not
otherwise a dependent), but excludes benefits received under the Social Security
Act, payments to victims of war crimes or crimes against humanity on account of
their status as victims of such crimes, and payments to victims of international
terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of title 18) or domestic terrorism (as defined in
section 2331 of title 18) on account of their status as victims of such terrorism.
11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) (Supp. 2016).
9 The deductions, described in § 707(b)(2XA)(ii)-(iv), include 'the debtor's applicable monthly expense
amounts specified under the National Standards and Local Standards, and the debtor's actual monthly
expenses for the categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by the Internal Revenue Service
for the area in which the debtor resides," 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I), the 'debtor's average monthly
payments on account of secured debts," 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii), and the "debtor's expenses for pay-
ment of all priority claims," 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iv).
"°The reason for multiplying by sixty is that, if the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim
objects to confirmation of a chapter 13 plan for an above-median debtor, either payments under the plan
must pay unsecured claims in full or "the plan [must] provide[ ] that all of the debtor's projected disposa-
ble income to be received in the applicable commitment period beginning on the date that the first pay-
ment is due under the plan will be applied to make payments to unsecured creditors under the plan." 11
U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 2016). The "applicable commitment period" for an above-median debtor is
not less than five years (sixty months). 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4)(AXii).
"111 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i). These dollar amounts are also subject to adjustment every three years
to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index. 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (Supp. 2016).
1211 U.S.C. § 707(b)(6).
"All references to the United States trustee in this paper should be read to include the bankruptcy
administrator in those jurisdictions where the bankruptcy administrator fulfills the role of the United
States trustee.
1411 U.S.C. § 707(b)(7)(A).
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date of the first meeting of creditors, file with the court a statement as to
whether the debtor's case would be presumed to be an abuse under section
707(b)."15 The court is directed to provide a copy of the statement to all
creditors not later than seven days after receiving it.16 In addition, if the
debtor is an above-median debtor and the United States trustee determines
that the debtor's chapter 7 case is presumed to be abusive under § 707(b),
the United States trustee must, pursuant to § 704(b)(2), either file a motion
to dismiss not later than thirty days after filing the initial statement of abuse,
or alternatively, file another statement "setting forth the reasons the United
States trustee ... does not consider such a motion to be appropriate."' 7
If the United States trustee (or the court, trustee, or any other party in
interest) files a motion to dismiss the debtor's chapter 7 case, the debtor may
attempt to rebut the presumption created by § 707(b)(2), but the grounds for
rebutting the presumption are narrow:
[T]he presumption of abuse may only be rebutted by dem-
onstrating special circumstances, such as a serious medical
condition or a call or order to active duty in the Armed
Forces, to the extent such special circumstances that [sic]
justify additional expenses or adjustments of current
monthly income for which there is no reasonable
alternative.' 8
The debtor may show such special circumstances only if the debtor "item-
ize[s] each additional expense or adjustment of income" 19 and "attest[s]
under oath to the accuracy of any information provided to demonstrate that
additional expenses or adjustments to income are required."20 Even if the
debtor meets these requirements, the debtor may rebut the presumption only
if those additional expenses or adjustments to income cause the debtor to
pass the means test (meaning the debtor's income available to pay unsecured
creditors is less than the statutory amounts). 21
One might assume that the United States trustee would bring a motion
to dismiss the chapter 7 case of an above-median debtor whenever the bank-
ruptcy petition and associated schedules filed by such a debtor demonstrates
failure of the means test, that is, when the computations described in
15 11 U.S.C. § 704(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 2016).
1611 U.S.C. § 704(b)(1)(B).
1711 U.S.C. § 704(b)(2).
1811 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i).
1911 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(ii). The debtor must also provide documentation for the expense or adjust-
ment to income and a detailed explanation of the special circumstances that make such expense or adjust-
ment to income "necessary and reasonable." 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(ii)(I) and (II).
2011 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(iii).
21See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(iv).
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§ 707(b)(2)(A), which are included in Official Form 122A-2, 22 result in a
dollar amount available to pay unsecured creditors in excess of the amount
specified by Congress as creating a presumption of abuse. At the very least,
one would think that the United States trustee would decline to file a mo-
tion to dismiss under § 704(b)(2) only if the debtor establishes to the satisfac-
tion of the United States trustee that the debtor would be able to rebut the
presumption of abuse under § 707(b)(2)(B)(i). But in fact, that is not the
case. In most cases, the United States trustee does not bring a motion to
dismiss a chapter 7 case filed by an above-median debtor even if the above-
median debtor cannot pass the means test and even if nothing in the record
demonstrates that the debtor would be able to meet the stringent require-
ments necessary to rebut the presumption of abuse.
In Part I of this article, I discuss the history of the role of the United
States trustee in implementing the means-testing provisions. I note that,
under the language adopted by Congress, the strict standards for rebutting a
presumption of abuse in § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) apply only to the court, not to the
United States trustee. Therefore, even if an above-median chapter 7 debtor
would be unable to rebut the presumption of abuse, the United States trus-
tee is free to determine under § 704(b)(2) not to file a motion to dismiss. In
Part II, I look at a sample of the actual decisions made by United States
trustees in chapter 7 cases of above-median debtors who fail to satisfy the
means test. I found that, in most cases in the sample, even if the debtor failed
the means test, the United States trustee declined to bring a motion to dis-
miss. In the cases in the study in which the debtor filed a document explain-
ing why the debtor believed that he or she should be allowed to remain in
chapter 7 before the United States trustee decided whether to file a motion
to dismiss (what I call a "preemptive rebuttal of presumption"), the United
States trustee declined to file such a motion in a very high percentage of the
cases. In all cases in the study, the United States trustee most often ex-
plained a decision not to file a motion to dismiss by noting that the debtor
had experienced a reduction in income from that used to make the computa-
tion of "current monthly income" under the means test. Therefore, I con-
clude that the United States trustees are utilizing their discretion under
§ 704(b)(2) to provide access to chapter 7 to those debtors whose financial
circumstances differ from those reflected in the mathematical computations
used to determine the presumption of abuse, discretion that Congress re-
moved from the bankruptcy judges when it amended § 707(b) in 2005.
"Official Form 122A-2 must be filed by an above-median individual debtor in a chapter 7 case either
with the bankruptcy petition or within fourteen days after the petition is filed. Fed. R. Bankr. P.
1007(b)(4), (c).
(Vol. 92
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I. CREATING A ROLE FOR THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEE IN
IMPLEMENTING THE MEANS TEST
From the time of its enactment in 1978, the Bankruptcy Code has permit-
ted the bankruptcy judge to dismiss chapter 7 cases under certain circum-
stances. The original standard enacted by Congress in § 707 of the Code
was dismissal "only for cause, including - (1) unreasonable delay by the
debtor that is prejudicial to creditors; and (2) nonpayment of any fees and
charges required under chapter 123 of title 28."23 After a series of oversight
hearings on consumer bankruptcy, 24 Congress added a new provision to
§ 707, allowing the court to dismiss a chapter 7 bankruptcy case filed by an
individual debtor whose debts were primarily consumer debts for "substan-
tial abuse."25 However, under the new provision only the court on its own
motion (but not at the request of a party in interest) could seek such a dismis-
sal, and Congress directed that there would be a presumption in favor of
allowing the debtor to remain in chapter 7.26
When the nationwide program of United States trustees was imple-
mented in 1986, Congress amended § 707(b) to permit the United States
trustee to bring a motion to dismiss a consumer debtor chapter 7 case for
substantial abuse, thus giving the Office of the United States Trustee author-
ity to implement the means test.27 Nevertheless, because of the statutory
presumption in favor of permitting chapter 7 filings by consumer debtors, the
United States trustees rarely brought such motions.28  When the United
23Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 707, 92 Stat. 2549, 2606 (1978).
24See Personal Bankruptcy: Oversight Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial
Law of the H. Comm. on the judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1981-1982).
25Bankruptcy Amendments & Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, sec. 312(2),
§ 707(b), 98 Star. 333, 355 (1984).26Section 707(b), as originally enacted, read as follows:
"(b) After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion and not at the request
or suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual
debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds that
the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter.
There shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the
debtor."
Id.
"
7Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-554, sec. 219, § 707(b), 100 Stat. 3088, 3101 (1986).
2 For the first ten years after the effective date of the 1986 amendments to § 707 to permit the
United States trustee to move to dismiss a case for substantial abuse, there were fewer than 100 reported
bankruptcy cases in which a United States trustee brought such a motion and the bankruptcy court ruled
on it. See In re Stewart, 201 B.R. 996 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1996); U.S. Trustee v. Duncan (In re Duncan),
201 B.R. 889 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996); In re Matias, 203 B.R. 490 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996); In re Oswald,
No. 96-70914, 1996 WL 33406627 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 1996); In re Mathes, No. 96-32602, 1996
WL 1055813 (Bankr. D. Minn. Aug. 21, 1996); In re Schmidt, 200 B.R. 36 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996); In re
Higuera, 199 B.R 196 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1996); In re Haffner, 198 B.R. 646 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1996); In re
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Stallman, 198 BR. 491 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1996); In re Mastromarino, 197 B.R. 171 (Bankr. D. Me.
1996); In re Ontiveros, No. 95-82072, 1996 WL 33401160 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 1996), rev'd, 198 B.R.
284 (C.D. Ill. 1996); In re Dickerson, 193 B.R. 67 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996); In re Braithwaite, 192 B.R. 882
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996); In re Vianese, 192 B.R. 61 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Balaja, 190 B.R. 335
(Bankr. N.D. 111. 1996); In re Richardson, No. 95-41052, 1995 WL 17005102 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Sept. 28,
1995); In re Gentri, 185 B.R. 368 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995); In re Dempton, 182 BR. 38 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1995); In re Blair, 180 B.R. 656 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995); In re Jarrell, 189 B.R. 374 (Bankr. M.D.N.C.
1995); In re Tylvasky, No. 94-31061, 1995 WL 1032564 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. Mar. 20, 1995); In re Messen-
ger, 178 B.R. 145 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995); In re Smith, No. 94-01953, 1995 WL 20345 (Bankr. D. Idaho
Jan. 11, 1995); U.S. Trustee v. Gavita (In re Gavita), 177 B.R. 43 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1994); In re Hill, No.
94-01881, 1994 WL 738663 (Bankr. D. Idaho Dec. 22, 1994); In re Farris, No. 94-40882, 1994 WL
16865633 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 1994); In re Christie, 172 B.t 233 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994); In re
Ragan, 171 B.R. 592 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994); In re Martens, 171 B.R. 43 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994); In re
Tindall, 184 B.R. 842 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994); In ie Dominguez, 166 B.R. 66 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1994); In re
Wilkinson, 168 B.R. 626 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994); In re Fessler, 168 BR. 622 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994); In
re Faulkner, 165 B.R. 644 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994); In re Morse, 164 B.R. 651 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1994);
In re Lee, 162 B.R. 31 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993); In re Rogers, 168 B.R. 806 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1993); U.S.
Trustee v. Bacco (In re Bacco), 160 B.R. 283 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993); In re Buntin, 161 BR. 466 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1993); U.S. Trustee v. Bush (In re Bush), No. 93-10771, 1993 WL 13004595 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
Oct. 15, 1993); In re McCormack, 159 BR. 491 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993); In re Marshalek, 158 B.R. 704
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993); In re Barnes, 158 B.R. 105 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1993); In re Laury-Norvell, 157
B.R. 14 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993); In re Hutton, 158 B.R. 648 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1993); In re Fitzgerald, 155
BR. 711 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993); In re Williams, 155 B.R. 773 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993); In re Smith, 157
B.R. 348 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993); In re Morris, 153 B.R. 559 (Bankr. D. Or. 1993); In re Dickerson, 166
B.R. 480 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993); In re Smurthwaite, 149 B.R. 409 (Bankr. N.D.W. Va. 1992); U.S.
Trustee v. Rowell (In re Rowell), No. 92-50228, 1992 WL 12004006 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Dec. 16, 1992); In
re Butts, 148 BR. 878 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1992); In re Shepherd, 147 B.R. 422 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992); In
re Farrell, 150 B.R. 116 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1992); In re Hampton, 147 BR. 130 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1992); In re
Richmond, 144 B.R. 539 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1992); In re Veenhuis, 143 B.R. 887 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992);
In re Traub, 140 BR. 286 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1992); In re Nolan, 140 B.R. 797 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992); U.S.
Trustee v. Wray (In re Wray), 136 B.R. 122 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992); In re Beles, 135 B.R. 286 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1991); In re Goodson, 130 B.R. 897 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1991); In re Fortune, 130 B.R. 525 (Bankr.
C.D. 11. 1991); U.S. Trustee v. Baribeau (In re Baribeau), No. 91-20140, 1991 WL 11767173 (Bankr. S.D.
Ga. July 26, 1991); In re Elliston, No. 91-50048, 1991 WL 11002685 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. July 15, 1991); In re
Scheinberg, 132 BR. 443 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1991), affd, 134 B.R. 426 (D. Kan. 1992); In re Stratton, 136
B.R. 804 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1991); In re Hammer, 124 B.R. 287 (Bankr. C.D. I1. 1991), vacated sub nom. In re
Pilgrim, 135 B.R. 314 (C.D. Il. 1992); In re Harris, 122 B.R. 744 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1990), rev'd, 125 B.R. 254
(D.S.D. 1991), affd sub noam. U.S. Trustee v. Harris, 960 F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1992); In re Dubberke, 119 B.R.
677 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1990); In re Helmick, 117 B.R. 187 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990); In re Johnson, 115 B.R.
159 (Bankr. S.D. Il. 1990); In re Vesnesky, 115 BR. 843 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990); In re Piontek, 113 BR.
17 (Bankr. D. Or. 1990); In re Cook, 110 BR. 544 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990); In re Roth, 108 B.R. 78
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989); In re Martin, 107 B.R. 247 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1989); In re Wilkes, 114 B.R. 551
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1989); In re Woodhall, 104 B.R. 544 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1989); In re Tefertiller, 104
B.R. 513 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989); In re Braley, 103 B.R. 758 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989), affd, 110 B.R. 211
(E.D. Va. 1990); In re Clark, 100 B.R. 821 (Bankr. W.D. Va.), appeal dismissed, 108 B.R. 566 (W.D. Va.
1989), rev'd, 927 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Gyurci, 95 B.R 639 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989); In re Busbin,
95 B.R. 240 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989); In re Andrus, 94 BR. 76 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988); In re Wegner, 91
B.R. 854 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988); In re Gaskins, 85 B.R. 846 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988); In re Strange, 85 B.R.
662 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1988); In re Goulding, 79 B.R. 874 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987); In re Restea, 76 BR. 728
(Bankr. D.S.D. 1987); see also Stuart v. Koch (In re Koch), 109 F.3d 1285 (8th Cir. 1997) (reversing
unreported bankruptcy court decision declining to dismiss for substantial abuse); Fonder v. United States,
974 F.2d 996 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming decision of bankruptcy court granting motion to dismiss for
substantial abuse); Green v. Staples (In re Green), 934 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1991) (reversing unreported
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States trustees did file motions, the bankruptcy courts denied them in a sig-
nificant number of the cases. 29
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission, established pursuant to
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,30 issued its report on the operation of
the Bankruptcy Code in 1997.3 ' Over the objection of four dissenting com-
missioners, the report included no suggestions to curb abuse by consumer
debtors, such as a mechanism for determining whether such debtors had re-
sources to fund a chapter 13 plan (so-called "means-testing" provisions).32
Dissenting commissioners James I. Shepard and The Hon. Edith H. Jones rec-
ommended that § 707(b) be amended to "require that the court dismiss or
convert the case of a debtor who has filed for Chapter 7 if ... it is found that
the debtor has the ability to repay a portion of his debts in Chapter 13."33
Over the next two years, various members of Congress introduced a se-
ries of bills intended to limit access to chapter 7 by debtors who could afford
to pay creditors in chapter 13. The bills generally either sought to amend
§ 109(b) to limit chapter 7 access to individual debtors who had income
available to pay creditors (as determined by some sort of a means test)34 or to
bankruptcy court decision granting motion to dismiss for substantial abuse); Heller v. Foulston (In re
Heller), 160 BR. 655 (D. Kan. 1993) (affirming unreported bankruptcy court decision granting motion to
dismiss for substantial abuse); Wilson v. U.S. Trustee (In re Wilson), 125 BR. 742 (W.D. Mich. 1990)
(affirming unreported bankruptcy court decision granting motion to dismiss for substantial abuse); In re
Herbst, 95 B.R. 98 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (reversing unreported bankruptcy court decision denying motion to
dismiss for substantial abuse); cf. In re Ploegert, 93 B.R. 641 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988) (granting motion
brought under § 707(b) by bankruptcy trustee rather than United States trustee).291n almost one-third of the reported cases for the first ten years, listed in note 28 supra, the bank-
ruptcy judge denied the motion to dismiss. See Koch, 109 F.3d 1285; Herbst, 95 B.R. 98; Higuera, 199 B.R.
196; Ontiveros, 1996 WL 33401160; Dickerson, 193 B.R. 67; Balaja, 190 BR. 335; Richardson, 1995 WL
17005102; Gentri, 185 B.R. 368; Messenger, 178 B.R. 145; Hill, 1994 WL 738663; Martens, 171 B.R. 43;
Fessler, 168 B.R. 622; Marshalek, 158 B.R. 704; Laury-Norvell, 157 BR. 14; Williams, 155 BR. 773;
Rowell, 1992 WL 12004006; Butts, 148 B.R. 878; Shepherd, 147 B.R. 422; Farrell, 150 B.R. 116; Beles, 135
B.R. 286; Fortune, 130 B.R. 525; Hammer, 124 BR. 287; Harris, 122 B.R. 744; Martin, 107 B.R. 247;
Wilkes, 114 B.R. 551; Tefertiller, 104 BR. 513; Braley, 103 B.R. 758; Clark, 100 BR. 821; Wegner, 91 B.R.
854; Goulding, 79 B.R. 874; Restea, 76 B.R. 728. Some of those decisions were reversed on appeal. See
Koch, 109 F.3d 1285; Herbst, 95 B.R. 98; Ontiveros, 198 B.R. 284; Hammer, vacated sub nom, In re Pilgrim,
135 B.R. 314; Harris, 125 B.R. 254; Clark, 927 F.2d 793.3
°National Bankruptcy Review Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 602, 108 Stat. 4106, 4147
(1984).
"
1See REPORT OF THE NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS
(Oct. 20, 1997) [hereinafter "REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT'].2See Recommendations for Reform of Consumer Bankruptcy Law by Four Dissenting Commissioners,
REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT, at 1043.33Hon. Edith H. Jones & Commissioner James I. Shepard, Additional Dissent to Recommendations for
Reform of Consumer Bankruptcy Law, REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT, at 1123, 1139.34See Responsible Borrower Protection Bankruptcy Act, H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. (1997); Consumer
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. (1998). The Senate approved an amendment to
H.R. 3150 by way of substituting the language of S. 1301 before it passed the bill, 144 CONG. REC.
S10767 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1998), so H.R. 3150 ultimately adopted the approach of the bills listed in note
36 infra.
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provide grounds for dismissing a filed chapter 7 case if the debtor failed such
a test.35 The early bills also proposed to modify § 704 of the Code to impose
a duty on the bankruptcy trustee to review the debtor's filing and report if
the debtor's case should be dismissed.36 Ultimately this review-and-report
function was supplemented with an affirmative obligation on the part of the
trustee confronted with a chapter 7 debtor who failed the means test either
to bring a motion to dismiss the chapter 7 case or to file an explanation as to
why the trustee thought such a motion inappropriate under the
circumstances. 37
In 1999, Senator Grassley introduced a new bankruptcy reform bill, S.
625, that modified the language of the proposed amendment to § 704, chang-
ing it in some significant ways. Most importantly, for the first time in any
means-testing bill, Senate or House, S. 625 imposed the duty of reviewing
materials filed by an individual chapter 7 debtor not on the bankruptcy or
panel trustee, but on the United States trustee. 38 This difference from the
conference version of H.R. 3150, which had previously passed the House,39
was not even mentioned by the Senate Judiciary Committee in the section of
its report entitled, "Major Differences Between S. 625 and the H.R. 3150
Conference Report."40 No other provision of § 704 (which is entitled "Du-
ties of trustee," referring to the panel or case trustee), purports to impose
duties on the United States trustee, whose functions are generally spelled out
in 28 U.S.C. § 586. The Department of Justice criticized this change, noting
that "in addition to all the duties that are currently performed (such as ensur-
ing that trustees are appointed and notified, section 341 meetings are set and
noticed, papers are filed, emergent issues are addressed, and cases evaluated
for possible abuse and section 707(b) issues), the limited time and resources of
the United States Trustee and court clerk will be diverted to evaluating and
noticing these statements."41
Despite the objections of the Department of Justice, the House and Sen-
"See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, S. 625, 106th Cong., § 102(bX2)(B) (Mar. 16, 1999); Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 833, 106th Cong., § 102(bX2)(iii) (Feb. 24, 1999); Consumer Lenders
and Borrowers Bankruptcy Accountability Act of 1998, H.R. 3146, 105th Cong., § 8(aX3) (Feb. 3, 1998);
Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1997, S. 1301, 105th Cong., § 102(a)(2XB)(ii) (Oct. 21, 1997).
36See S. 625, 106th Cong., § 102(b)(2XB) (Mar. 16, 1999); H.R. 833, 106th Cong., § 102(bX2)(iii)
(Feb. 24, 1999); H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 101(5) (Feb. 3, 1998); H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. 1st Sess.,
§ 101(5) (Sept. 18, 1997); see also HR. 3146, 105th Cong., § 8(a)(3) (Feb. 3, 1998) (proposing to amend
§ 707(b) to require the case trustee to review and refer to the United States trustee for dismissal motion).37See H.R_ REP. No. 105-794, at 6-7 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (concerning H.R. 3150).
38S. 625, § 102(bX2)(B).
39See 144 CONG. REc. H10239-40 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998).
'S. REP. No. 106-49, at 13-14 (1999).
4 1See Letter from Dennis K. Burke, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of
Legislative Affairs, to Orrin Hatch, Chairman of Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 5 (Apr. 9, 1999) (on
file with author) [hereinafter -DOJ letter"]. Given the "substantial burdens" the bill would impose on the
(Vol. 92
2018) SECTION 704(b)(2)-THE BACK DOOR INTO CHAPTER 7 497
ate approved a compromise bill, S. 3186,42 which included a provision impos-
ing this obligation on the United States trustees.43 President Clinton
declined to sign the bill within ten days after it was submitted to him, during
a period when Congress was adjourned, effectively vetoing it.44 Neverthe-
less, the duties of the United States trustee remained in every version of
§ 704 in all subsequent Congressional bills, both in the House45 and the Sen-
ate.46 The last bill to be introduced, S. 256, was enacted into law as the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. 47
The only subsequent amendment to the language of § 704, as enacted in
2005, was made by H.R. 1626, the Statutory Time-Periods Technical
Amendments Act of 2009.48 That act changed all references in title 11 to "5
days," including in § 704(b)(1)(B), to '7 days" to conform to the new revi-
sions to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. The bill was passed by
both House49 and Senate,50 and signed into law on May 7, 2009.5 1
II. EXERCISING THE DUTIES OF THE UNITED STATES
TRUSTEE
Under the language of § 704(b)(1), the United States trustee is required
to review all materials submitted by an individual debtor filing a case under
chapter 7 to determine "whether the debtor's case would be presumed to be
an abuse under section 707(b)." 52  To facilitate that examination, Federal
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1007(b)(4) requires that all individual chapter
7 debtors who are not exempt from the means test under § 707(b)(2)(D)5 3
United States Trustee program, the Department of Justice requested that a special appropriation be au-
thorized to implement this provision, among others. Id. at 33.
42See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, S. 3186, 106th Cong. (2000).
4 The text of S. 3186 was incorporated into the conference report on H.R. 2415, an unrelated bill,
H.R. REP. No. 106-970 (2000), at 1 (Conf. Rep.), and the conference report was passed by both the
House, 146 CONG. REc. H9840 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2000), and the Senate, 146 CoNG. REc. S11730 (daily
ed. Dec. 7, 2000).
44U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
45See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 975, 108th Cong.
(Feb. 27, 2003); Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 5745, 107th
Cong. (2002); Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, H.R_ 333, 107th
Cong. (Jan. 31, 2001).
46See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, S. 256, 109th Cong. (Feb.
1, 2005); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 420, 107th Cong. (Mar. 1, 2001); Bankruptcy Reform Act of
2001, S. 220, 107th Cong. (2001).4 7Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
4SH.R. 1626, 111th Cong. (Mar. 19, 2009).
49155 CONG. REc. H4665 (Apr. 22, 2009).
50155 CONG. REc. S4763 (Apr. 27, 2009).
5iPub. L. No. 111-16, 123 Stat. 1607 (2009).
5211 U.S.C. § 704(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 2016).
511 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(D) (Supp. 2016) makes § 707(b)(2)(A) through -(C) inapplicable to a disabled
veteran with respect to indebtedness incurred primarily during a period of active duty or service of a
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file a statement of current monthly income on Official Form 122A-1,54 and if
that form shows that the debtor is an above-median debtor,55 such a debtor
must prepare Official Form 122A-2, which is the chapter 7 means-test calcu-
lation. The front page of the form includes a box at the upper right-hand
corner in which the debtor, after completing the means test computations,
must check the appropriate box, either "[t]here is no presumption of abuse"
or "[t]here is a presumption of abuse." However, after the portion of Form
122A-2 in which such computations are made, the debtor is asked whether
there are "any special circumstances that justify additional expenses or adjust-
ments of current monthly income for which there is no reasonable alterna-
tive," citing § 707(b)(2)(B).56
Whether or not a debtor includes language in the special circumstances
section of the applicable form, some debtors also file a document explaining
why their chapter 7 case should not be presumed to be abusive even before
the United States trustee files a notice of presumed abuse, what I call a "pre-
emptive rebuttal of presumption." Since 2007, this document, called "Rebut-
tal of Presumption of Abuse," has been included in the set of forms available
from Best Case Bankruptcy software, used by many bankruptcy lawyers for
petition preparation. Indeed, some lawyers file a rebuttal of presumption of
abuse or affidavit regarding special circumstances even when their Form
122A-2 does not show a presumption of abuse.
57
The United States trustee reviews the debtor's filings and, not later than
ten days after the date of the first meeting of creditors under § 341, must file
homeland defense activity or with respect to a debtor on and during the 540-day period following active
duty or performing a homeland security activity. As a result, such a debtor is not subject to a motion to
dismiss or convert on the basis of the means test.54Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1007(b)(4) requires the filing of "a statement of current
monthly income prepared as prescribed by the appropriate Official Form." FED. R. BANiKR. P. 1007(bX4).
"Id. (stating, "if the current monthly income exceeds the median family income for the applicable state
and household size, [an individual debtor in a chapter 7 case shall file] the information, including calcula-
tions, required by § 707(b), prepared as prescribed by the appropriate Official Form").
"Official Form 122A-2, pt. 4. In the prior comparable bankruptcy form, Official Form 22A (Dec.
2010), Part VII of the form asked only if there were 'any monthly expenses, not otherwise stated in this
form, that are required for the health and welfare of you and your family and that you contend should be
an additional deduction from your current monthly income under § 707(b)(2XA)(ii)(1)."
"7See, e.g., Debtor's Statement of Special Circumstances, In re Fernandez, No. 14-42778 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. June 27, 2014), ECF No. 5; Affidavit of Special Circumstances, In re Gonzalez, No. 13-47096 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. Apr. 8, 2013), ECF No. 9; Debtor's Statement of Special Circumstances, In re Coppola, No. 12-
70958 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2012), ECF No. 8-2; Affidavit of Special Circumstances, In re King, No.
12-01731 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. Feb. 29, 2012), ECF No. 5; Debtor's Statement of Special Circumstances, In
re Peixoto-Lyons, No. 12-41747 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2012), ECF No. 5; Affidavit of Special Circum-
stances, In re Price, No. 12-43086 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2012), ECF No. 9; Affidavit of Thomas
Gerard Husson, In re Husson, No. 12-42567 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Feb. 6, 2012), ECF No. 9; Debtor's
Statement of Special Circumstances, In re Birnbaum, No. 11-50359 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2011), ECF
No. 9; Affidavit of Special Circumstances, In re Little, No. 08-51372 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 2008),
ECF No. 37.
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a statement with the court as to whether the debtor's case would be pre-
sumed to be an abuse under § 707(b). 58 Not later than thirty days after filing
that statement, the United States trustee must either file a motion to dismiss
the case for abuse or file a statement setting forth the reasons why the
United States trustee does not consider that such is motion is "appropri-
ate."59 Section 704(b), which imposes these obligations, gives no guidance as
to when the United States trustee should decline to file a dismissal motion.
Section 707(b)(2)(B), by contrast, sets stringent statutory standards for
rebutting the presumption of abuse.60 However, those provisions are applica-
ble only after a motion to dismiss the case has been filed. Thus, the United
States trustee is not bound by any interpretation of "special circumstances"
when deciding whether to file a motion to dismiss in the first instance. Al-
though not bound by the statutory special circumstances doctrine, I had as-
sumed that that the United States Department of Justice would nonetheless
take special circumstances into account when deciding whether to file a mo-
tion to dismiss. I further assumed that the United States trustees would
decline to bring a motion to dismiss only in those cases in which the debtors
would be able to rebut the presumption of abuse. I set out to discover if my
assumptions were accurate.
Given the absence of statutory guidance, my first task was to see if the
Department of Justice had formal guidelines to assist the United States trust-
ees, that is, some sort of list of factors that they should be considering in
determining whether to file a motion to dismiss under § 704(b)(2). I re-
quested any such guidelines both informally and through a Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA) request. In the formal response to my FOIA request, the
Department of Justice stated that there were eighteen pages of documents
that met my request for information, but that all such materials were being
withheld in their entirety pursuant to FOIA Exemption 5 (which protects
"inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency"),61 and as "attorney work product."62 In discussions with the FOIA
counsel, I was told that the Department was relying on the "deliberative
5811 U.S.C. § 704(b)(1)(A).
5911 U.S.C. § 704(b)(2).
'Section 707(bX2)(B)(i) states that, in any such proceeding, "the presumption of abuse may only be
rebutted by demonstrating special circumstances, such as a serious medical condition or a call or order to
active duty in the Armed Forces, to the extent such special circumstances [ ] justify additional expenses or
adjustments of current monthly income for which there is no reasonable alternative." 11 U.S.C.
§ 707(b)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. 2016).
6iSee 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (Supp. 2016).
62See Letter from Paul Bridenhagen, FOIA Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to author (Jan. 27, 2017) (on
file with author).
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process privilege" in withholding the documents. 63
Because the Department would not disclose its own guidelines, I was left
with reviewing the cases in which the United States trustees had filed a
motion to dismiss to see if I could discern any patterns. I initially searched
for all cases in which the United States trustee filed a § 704(b)(1) statement
of presumed abuse or a motion based on the presumption of abuse.64 I discov-
ered that in hundreds of those cases in which there was a presumption of
abuse, the United States trustees filed statements indicating that a motion to
dismiss was not appropriate. Feeling somewhat overwhelmed by the number
of cases, I decided to look at cases in which the United States trustee submit-
ted a statement of presumed abuse under § 704(b)(1) or filed a motion to
dismiss based on presumed abuse if the case was filed during any of two
specific months of each year from 2005 through 2016. I looked at a different
two-month filing period for each successive year to avoid any bias based on
the calendar month of filing.6 5 The cases, therefore, included twenty-four
months of filings.
From that group, I eliminated any cases in which the United States trus-
tee ultimately concluded that the presumption of abuse either was not pre-
sent or not applicable (i.e., because debtor did not have primarily consumer
debts).66 Also excluded were cases in which (for whatever reason) the
6 3The 'deliberative process privilege" is intended to protect the decision-making process of a govern-
ment agency. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150 (1975).
'I searched the bankruptcy court dockets using Bloomberg Law. I included searches for "presumed
abuse" as well as '704(b)(1)," "704(b)(2)," "presumption of abuse," and "motion to dismiss" for the relevant
months.
6 5 A comparison of quarterly filings from the United States Courts website (Table F-2) over the years
2005 through 2016, UNITED STATES COURTS, BANKRUPTCY FILINGS, http://www.uscourts.gov/report-
name/bankruptcy-filings, revealed that the number of chapter 7 filings did not vary dramatically between
quarters so that sampling from different two-month periods during those years would not result in a
skewed sample. The cases I examined were those filed during November and December 2005; January and
February 2006; March and April 2007; May and June 2008; July and August 2009; September and Octo-
ber 2010; November and December 2011; January and February 2012; March and April 2013; May and
June 2014; July and August 2015; and September and October 2016.
66
n some cases, the United States trustee reached that conclusion only after filing a motion to dismiss
for abuse that was later withdrawn. See, e.g., Motion to Dismiss Case for Abuse, In re Pollock, No. 13-
51115 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. July 12, 2013), withdrawn, Aug. 26, 2013; Motion of United States Trustee to
Dismiss Case for Abuse, In re Fletcher, No. 10-53109 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Dec. 16, 2010), motion under
§ 707(bX2) resolved by stipulation, Sept. 22, 2011; Motion to Dismiss Chapter 7 Case, In re Aniol, No. 08-
26810 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Sept. 26, 2008), withdrawn, Dec. 16, 2008; United States Trustee's Motion to
Dismiss Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(b)(1) and (bX2) and Brief in Support Thereof, In re Coughlin, No.
08-31310 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2008), withdrawn, Dec. 4, 2008; United States Trustee's Motion to
Dismiss Case Subject to 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) or § 707(b)(3), In re Burch, No. 08-07526 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
Sept. 5, 2008), withdrawn, Nov. 17, 2008; United States Trustee's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 11
U.S.C. Section 707(b)(1), In re Stanley, No. 08-05906 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Aug. 18, 2008), withdrawn, Feb.
24, 2009; Motion to Dismiss Debtors' Case Under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) and § 707(bX2) or (b)(3), In re
Melvin, No. 08-17147 (Bankr. D. Colo. Aug. 6, 2008), withdrawn, Dec. 30, 2008; Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to § 707(b)(2) for the Presumption of Abuse or, in the Alternative, Dismiss Pursuant to 11
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U.S.C. § 707(b)(3), In re Malucci, No. 08-12369 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 25, 2008), withdrawn, Oct. 20,
2008; United States Trustee's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) and 707(b)(3), In re
Ryan, No. 08-40994 (Bankr. D. Neb. July 14, 2008), withdrawn, Aug. 25, 2008; Motion of the United
States Trustee to Dismiss Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sections 707(b)(2) & (3), In re Beougher, No. 07-51080
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug. 9,2007), withdrawn, Oct. 24, 2007; United States Trustee's Motion to Dismiss or
Convert Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) and (b), In re Wilborn, No. 07-10724 (Bankr. D. Kan. July 6,
2007), withdrawn, Sept. 4, 2007; United States Trustee's Motion to Dismiss, In re Johnson, No. 07-31404
(Bankr. D. Or. July 2, 2007), withdrawn, July 24, 2007; Motion, Memorandum of Law and Notice of
Motion to Dismiss Chapter 7 Case Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) and/or § 707(b)(3), In re Troxell,
No. 07-11187 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio May 24, 2007), withdrawn, Oct. 4, 2007; Motion to Dismiss; and Notice,
In re Goodwin, No. 07-60250 (Bankr. D. Mont. May 11, 2007), withdrawn, May 25, 2007; United States
Trustee's Motion to Dismiss Case Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sections 707(b)(2) and 707(b)(3), In re Kelder,
No. 06-00455 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. June 2, 2006), withdrawn, Feb. 20, 2007; United States Trustee's
Motion to Dismiss Under 11 U.S.C. § 707(bX2) & (3), In re Sloan, No. 06-30231 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio May
17, 2006), withdrawn, Dec. 20, 2006; Motion of U.S. Trustee to Dismiss Chapter 7 Case Pursuant to 11
U.S.C. §§ 707(bX2) & (3) and Memorandum in Support, In re Langford, No. 06-30238 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
May 15, 2006), withdrawn, July 28, 2006; Motion of United States Trustee to Dismiss Case Pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2), In re Dahle, No. 06-20310 (Bankr. D. Utah Apr. 24, 2006), withdrawn, Aug. 18,
2006; United States Trustee's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(b)(2) & (3), In re McCon-
nell, No. 06-00057 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa Mar. 10, 2006), withdrawn, Oct. 19, 2006; United States Trustee's
Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2), In re Hoffman, No. 05-11176 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa Jan.
11, 2006), withdrawn, Feb. 3, 2006; United States Trustee's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 707(b)(2), In re Allison, No. 05-11163 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa Dec. 16, 2005), withdrawn, Feb. 3, 2006;
United States Trustee's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707(bX2), In re Holland, No. 05-
11139 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa Dec. 14, 2005), withdrawn, Feb. 2, 2006.
In other cases, the United States trustee had initially concluded that there was a presumption of abuse
based on a rejected interpretation of permissible deductions under the means test and chose to file a
statement declining to file a motion to dismiss rather than withdrawing the statement of presumption. See,
e.g., Notice, In re Williams, No. 13-53353 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio June 12, 2013); United States Trustee's
Declination Statement Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 704(b)(2), In re Evangelista, No. 10-25378 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. Jan. 21, 2011); Notice of United States Trustee's Statement Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 704(b)(2), In re
Gates, No. 08-14805 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Dec. 1, 2008); United States Trustee's Statement That a Motion
to Dismiss is Not Appropriate Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 704(b)(2), In re Booher, No. 08-52334 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio Oct. 6, 2008); United States Trustee's Statement Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 704(bX2), In re
Steltenkamp, No. 08-13556 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Sept. 11, 2008); Notice of United States Trustee's State-
ment Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 704(b)(2), In re Richmond, No. 08-14856 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2008);
Notice of United States Trustee's Statement Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 704(b)(2), In re Redmond, No. 08-
14856 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2008); United States Trustee's Statement Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 704(bX2), In re Dowalter, No. 08-55701 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Sept. 3, 2008); United States Trustee's
Statement Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 704(b)(2), In re Artola, No. 08-18334 (Bankr. S.D Fla. Aug. 27, 2008);
United States Trustee's Statement Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 704(bX2), In re Duquette, No. 08-12921
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. Aug. 22, 2008); Notice of United States Trustee's Statement Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 704(b)(2), In re Bunch, No. 08-52003 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 2008); Notice of United States Trus-
tee's Statement Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 704(bX2), In re Davis-Fox, No. 08-51746 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio July
28, 2008); United States Trustee's Statement Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 704(b)(2), In re Williams, No. 08-
54267 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio July 23, 2008); Notice of United States Trustee's Statement Pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 704(b)(2), In re Dietz, No. 08-14575 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio July 21, 2008); Notice of United States
Trustee's Statement Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 704(bX2), In re Harries, No. 08-14447 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio,
2008; Notice of United States Trustee's Statement Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 704(b)(2), In re Lamar, No.
07-13075 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio June 27, 2007); United States Trustee's Statement That a Motion to Dismiss
is Not Appropriate Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 704(bX2), In re Gilner, No. 08-51607 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio June
22, 2008); Notice of United States Trustee's Statement Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 704(b)(2), In re Hess, No.
07-31689 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug. 1, 2007) (in which trustee disagreed with court decisions permitting
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United States trustee filed neither a motion to dismiss based on the presump-
tion of abuse nor a statement declining to do so. (These included cases in
which the trustee filed a motion to dismiss on grounds other than the pre-
sumption of abuse.67) I also eliminated any cases in which, after the United
States trustee filed a notice of presumed abuse, the debtor elected to convert
the case to one under chapter 13 or 11 before a motion to dismiss was filed.68
This left me with a pool of 395 cases in which the United States trustee
either filed a motion to dismiss based on the presumption of abuse or filed a
statement that the United States trustee was declining to file such a motion
despite the existence of the presumption.69
In reviewing those cases, I discovered that, contrary to my initial assump-
tions, in cases filed by above-median debtors the United States trustees have
declined to bring motions to dismiss far more often than they filed motions to
dismiss. When they declined to bring such motions, their reasons for doing so
appeared to be unaffected by the special circumstances doctrine. In fact, al-
though the debtors frequently attempted to assert the existence of "special
circumstances" in their statements seeking to convince the United States
trustee not to bring a motion to dismiss, 70 in the declination filings made by
the United States trustee, I found that the words "special circumstances"
were almost never used.71 Instead, the United States trustee referred to
debtor to deduct secured payments on property to be surrendered); see also Notice of United States
Trustee's Statement Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 704(bX2), In re Marmol, No. 08-13836 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
July 2, 2008) (in which trustee disagreed with decision allowing deduction of transportation ownership for
car owned free and clear).
I also eliminated one case in which the debtor's petition showed no presumption of abuse, but the
United States trustee initially filed a statement of presumed abuse and then filed on the same day a
statement that no motion to dismiss would be appropriate, without stating any reasons. I suspect the
United States trustee realized the initial notice had been filed in error. See Notice, In re Bryant, No. 12-
50068 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 2012).67See, e.g., In re Cromwell, No. 14-03707 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Sept. 4, 2014).
6 See, e.g., In re Jones, No. 07-10902 (Bankr. D. Kan. Oct. 12, 2007).
69 For ease of reference, the 395 cases that serve as my sample are identified in Appendix A, listed
alphabetically by the last name of the debtor (or in a joint case, by the last name of the first-listed debtor),
with the case number, court name, and petition date. Citations herein to these cases generally is solely by
reference to the last name of the debtor.
These 395 cases, of course, are only a very small percentage of the chapter 7 cases filed by consumers
during the relevant months. For example, according to statistics published by the Department of Justice,
in October, 2016 there were 37,141 nonbusiness chapter 7 filings. See Table F-2, U.S. Bankruptcy Courts
- Business and Nonbusiness Cases Commenced by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, During the One-
Month Period Ending October 31, 2016, Based on Data Current as of December 31, 2016, http://
www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/f-2-onemonth/bankruptcy-filings/2016/12/31. Of those cases, only
11 appear in the study. Most chapter 7 cases are filed by debtors who pass the means test.
7
°See Part B infra.7 5lndeed, I found only 5 filings by a United States trustee that used the term "special circumstances."
See United States Trustee's Declination Statement (With Certificate of Service), In re Kuceris, No. 13-
11567 (Bankr. D. Mass. Dec. 21, 2015), ECF No. 61; United States Trustee's Declination Statement
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707(bX2), In re Neuman-Pouncy, No. 08-06315 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Apr. 30, 2009),
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"compelling circumstances," "change of circumstances," or just "circum-
stances," although they often added language from § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) sug-
gesting there was "no reasonable alternative."
In the following sections I will analyze the cases in the study to see how
often the United States trustee filed a motion to dismiss or convert, the rea-
sons described by the United States trustee for not filing a motion to dismiss,
the impact on that decision of the filing of a preemptive rebuttal of presump-
tion, and how the frequency of such determinations varied by region and by
year.
A. FILING A MOTION TO DISMISS
Of the 395 cases in the study, all involved chapter 7 filings by above-
median debtors for whom the presumption of abuse arose. The United
States trustee filed a motion to dismiss based on the presumption of abuse in
only 168 of them (i.e., 42.5%).72 Even more remarkable, of those cases in
which motions were filed, the United States trustee withdrew or abandoned
forty-nine (other than by reason of mootness on conversion of the case from
chapter 7 to chapter 13 or chapter 11),71 and the bankruptcy courts denied
ECF No. 46; United States Trustee's Declination Statement Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 704(b)(2), In re
Alexander, No. 2:08-bk-18093 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2009), ECF No. 33; United States Trustee State-
ment Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 704(b)(2), In re Walter, No. 08-20365 (Bankr. W.D. La. Aug. 11, 2008),
ECF No. 26; cf. United States Trustee's Statement Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 704(b)(2), In re Anderson,
No. 09-02142 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Apr. 28, 2011), ECF No. 103 (citing § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) in the declination
statement when using the phrase "additional expenses or adjustments of current monthly income for which
there is no reasonable alternative").
72See Acosta; Albrecht; Allen; Allison; Banks James; Barber; Barker; Barraza; Barrett; Bearshak; Beasley;
Bell; Bishop; Boatright; Braathun; Bradley; Brosius; Bushinski; Camp; Castle; Chamness; Champagne;
Champine; Chan; Cherniak; Clinton; Close; Courtney, Coverstone; Cox; Crego; Curtis; Davis; Degree;
Diezi; Connie Donovan; Joseph Donovan; Edwards; Enriquez; Erickson; Escano; Thomas Evans; Fletcher;
Fonash; Foster; Fudge; Goodall; Grabarczyk; Sheila Green; Grinkmeyer; Groves; Haddock; Hampton; Harlin;
Harper; Harris; Jammie Hartley; Steven Hartley; Heslop; Hickman; Vernon Hinkle; Hitchcock; Hodson; Hol-
liday; Holmes; Hull; Josephine Hunt; Hutchinson; Harold Jackson; Jadhav; Jaramillo; Jennings; Jessup; Johns;
Dwayne Johnson; Katz; Knepper; Krahn; Krawczyk; Labruno; Leary; Lenton; Lunn; Maertens; Makres;
Mancera; Manley; Masur; Maura; Maya; McCain; McCarville; McKay-Polly; McMillan; Meade; Merino;
Guy Miller; Linda Miller; Vede Miller; Millikan; Milton; Carrie Mitchell; Moose; Moranz; Mortakis;
Nebres; Nichols; Niles; Northcutt; Daniel Oliver; Olson; Oriti; Parker; Patrick; Pearce; Plotchev; Russell
Pollock; Rapp; Renteria; Rey, Rieck I; Rieck II; Roman; Rongione; Ryder; St. Jean; Samaro; Sanders; Sekardi;
Senez; Shaffer, Shahidi; Ronald Sharpe; Simmons; Singer; Singletary; Skaggs; Carrie Smith; Douglas Smith;
Louie Smith; Richard Smith; Sookhram; Speakman; Spearman; Springer; Steers; Sterkel; Sterrenberg;
Stoltman; Swanson; Talmadge; Thelen; Gregory Thompson; Thorien; Tomlinson; Townsend; Uder Lopez;
Vanek; VanMeter, Vidis; Weber; Weinert; Wilkins; Willis; Wise-, Wiseman; Woods; Wright.73See Allison; Barker, Bearshak; Bell; Brosius; Bushinsi; Chamness; Clinton; Grabarczyk; Haddock;
Hampton; Harlin; Harper; Jammie Hartley; Steven Hartley; Heslop; Vernon Hinkle-, Hitchcock; Holmes;
Jadhav; Knepper Krahn; Maertens; Mancera; Manley; Masur, McCarville Meade; Merino; Guy Miller;
Millikan; Milton; Plotchev; Russell Pollock; Rapp; Samaro; Sekardi; Speakman; Spearman; Springer; Sterkel;
Stoltman; Tomlinson; Weber; Wiseman; Woods; cf. Barber (motion filed on "precautionary" basis and not
pursued after United States trustee successfully obtained denial of discharge); Dwayne Johnson (motion
stayed and never renewed); Vidas (motion dismissed with prejudice). This does not include cases in which
AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL
twenty-four others.74 In twenty-seven of the 168 cases, the debtor either
converted the chapter 7 case to a chapter 13 or chapter 11 reorganization
proceeding or dismissed the bankruptcy filing before the court reached a deci-
sion on the motion.75 Only sixty-eight of the motions were granted, generally
leading to dismissal or conversion. 76 If the United States trustees' success on
their § 707(b)(2) motions includes both a court order dismissing the case or
the debtor's agreement to voluntarily dismiss or convert, then the United
States trustees succeeded in only ninety-five of the 168 cases (i.e., 57%).
It is interesting to note that the United States trustees have filed many
fewer motions to dismiss in recent years (as compared to the three years after
the effective date of BAPCPA, 2006, 2007 and 2008), but they have realized
a much higher success rate, as the following chart demonstrates:
the trustees seem to have concluded, based on filed submissions from the debtors, that the cases did not
present a presumption of abuse. See supra note 66. The United States trustee withdrew the motions in
Millikan and Masur after they were granted and affirmed on appeal.74See Boatright; Braathun; Bradley; Close; Thomas Evans; Foster;, Holliday, Josephine Hunt; Hutchinson;
Harold Jackson; Jessup; Labruno; Makres; Nebres; Parker; Rongione; Sanders; Ronald Sharpe; Simmons;
Carrie Smith; Louie Smith; Thelen; Gregory Thompson; Wilkins. In Holliday, the court denied the motion,
but the debtor converted the case to chapter 13.
75See Acosta; Albrecht; Allen; Barrett; Chan; Coverstone; Cox; Curtis; Degree; Sheila Green; Groves;
Leary; Carrie Mitchell; Moose; Moranz; Mortakis; Nichols; Niles; Northcutt; Oriti; Patrick; Senez; Singer;
Uder Lopez; Vanek; VanMeter; Wright.
"In sixty of the cases, the court dismissed the case under § 707(b)(2). See Banks James; Barraza;
Beasley; Bishop; Castle;, Champagne; Champine; Cherniak; Courtney; Crego; Davis; Diezi; Connie Donovan;
Joseph Donovan; Edwards; Erickson; Escano; Fletcher; Fonash; Fudge; Goodall; Grinkmeyer; Harris; Jammie
Hartley; Hickman; Hull; Jennings; Johns; Katz; Krawczyk; Lenton; Maura; McCain; McKay-Polly; McMil-
lan; Linda Miller; Vede Miller Oliver, Olson; Rentera; Rieck I; Reick II; Rey; Roman; Ryder; St. Jean;
Shaffer; Shahidi; Singletary; Skaggs; Douglas Smith; Sookhram; Swanson; Steers; Talmadge; Thorien; Town-
send; Weinart; Willis; Wise. These include cases in which the courts stated that they would grant the
motions unless the debtors converted the cases within a short time. In one more, Maya, the court denied
the motion to dismiss under § 707(b)(2) but granted it under § 707(bX3). In five more cases, Camp,
Jaramillo, Pearce, Richard Smith, and Sterrenberg, the courts did not address the § 707(bX2) motions but
dismissed the cases based on § 707(b)(3). In two cases, Millikan and Masur, the bankruptcy courts
granted the motions, and those decisions were affirmed on appeal, but the United States trustees then
withdrew the motions.
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the opinion that a motion to dismiss is not appropriate, sets forth the reasons
for that decision, and describes the facts that gave rise to that conclusion.
By far the most frequently cited reason for declining to bring a motion to
dismiss was the fact that the debtor's actual monthly income at the time of
the filing, or anticipated monthly income in the future, did not correspond to
the 'current monthly income" figure utilized in determining whether there
was a presumption of abuse. As previously discussed,78 the computations
contained in § 707(b)(2) begin with the debtor's "current monthly income" as
defined in § 101(10A). That definition specifies that current monthly in-
come is the average monthly income for the six-month period ending on the
last day of the calendar month before the case was filed. 79 If income received
during that historic period was higher than debtor's actual current or antici-
pated monthly income, the debtor will not be able to devote the amount of
income derived from the means test to fund a chapter 13 plan.
The Supreme Court recognized this problem in the context of the "pro-
jected disposable income" test for confirmation of a chapter 13 plan80 in Ham-
ilton v. Lanning.81 The Court there determined that in applying the
projecteddisposable-income test in chapter 13, a bankruptcy court "may ac-
count for changes in the debtor's income or expenses that are known or virtu-
ally certain at the time of confirmation."8 2 To interpret the test to require
the debtor to apply income that will not actually be received to make plan
payments would be "a hollow command."83
The chapter 7 debtor is faced with the same problem. The means test is
intended to ascertain whether the debtor has the means to fund a chapter 13
plan, but if the income or expense figures used in the test are not a realistic
picture of the debtor's available net income, the test does not serve its in-
tended purpose. Unfortunately, the usual statutory means to rebut the pre-
75See supra text accompanying note 8.
79 See supra note 8.
80 Generally, a chapter 13 plan cannot be confirmed unless the plan provides that "all of the debtor's
projected disposable income to be received in the applicable commitment period ... will be applied to make
payments to unsecured creditors under the plan." 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 2016). Unless the
debtor's plan provides for payment in full of all allowed unsecured claims over a shorter period, the 'appli-
cable commitment period" is either three years or not less than five years, depending on whether the
debtor's income is below or above the median income for the applicable state. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)4)(A).
"Disposable income" is defined as 'current monthly income" (with certain exclusions) 'less amounts reason-
ably necessary to be expended" for maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor,
charitable contributions, and (if debtor is engaged in a business) business expenses. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2).
If the debtor is an above-median debtor, amounts reasonably necessary to be expended for maintenance or
support must be determined in accordance with the deductions allowed in the means test under
§707(b)(2)(A) and (B). 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3).
s15 6 0 U.S. 505 (2010).
82 d. at 524.
55Id. at 519.
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sumption of abuse by showing "special circumstances" 8 4 has almost never
been interpreted to include the circumstance of an ordinary loss of income or
increased living expenses.85 Indeed, in Hamilton, the Court noted that the
"petitioner direct[ed the Court] to no authority for the proposition that a
prepetition decline in income would qualify as a 'special circumstance. ' "8 6
In 181 of the 230 cases in which the United States trustees declined to
file motions to dismiss, i.e., 79%, the trustees cited a loss of or reduction in
income from employment or support payments that had been included in
completing the means test8 7 or otherwise described circumstances under
which debtors received income during the six-month period that was used to
compute "current monthly income" that they did not expect to receive in the
future.88 In another sixteen cases, the United States trustees noted some
anticipated expenses that were not considered in the means test.89
s4 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 2016).
"
5See Laura B. Bartell, Very Special Circumstances - The Almost Irrebutable Presumption of Abuse
Under Section 707(b)(2), 91 Am. BANKR. L.J. 393, 421 (2017).
86560 U.S. at 524.
"
7See Altaffer; Baker; Bells; Benson; Boyd; Brand; Brandon; Branscom; Branscome; Braud; Braunreiter;
Bray; Brooks; Chanel Brown; Rose Brown; Buford; Burgmeier; Byers; Caban; Calhoun; Cali; Carruth; Cast;
Cavazos; Cleveland; Colbath; Colbert; Collins; Colucci; Conroy; Corpus; Correll; Coulombe; Coyle; Crow;
Curtin; Dickmann; Diephof;, DiThomas; Dowl; Drake; Duffin; Durrington; Alice Evans; Fausto; Ferbrache;
Ferraro; Fitting; Ford; Glover; Gordan-Dickson; Guettler; Guidry; Habets; Haider; Hancock; Holahan;
Ivancic; Angela Jackson; Johar; John-Lewis; Dwight Johnson; Nancy Johnson; Johnston; June Jones; Justice;
Kalal; Kalata; Kane; Kendrick; Kimberlin; Kirkham; Koupal; Kryza; Kuceris; Lindsay; Long; Lull; Lustick;
Maloy; Marbury; Marisay; Mason; Mayo; Mays; McCaulley; McCollough-Bushey; McCollum; McCul-
lough; McKee; McLean; McNelly; Meyer; Mielke; Mier;, Steven Miller; Montanez; Myles; Navejar;
Neibauer; Neubert; Neuman-Pouncy; Nguyen; Nichols; Niedermier; Odden; Michael Oliver; Ortego; Ost;
Partin; Pasquale;, Passino; Amy Pollock; Pope; Reed; Riley; James Roberts; Ralph Roberts; Robinson; Rodgers;
Rodriguez; Rogers; Rubner, Sanford; Schmolke; Senez; Sharp; Anthony Sharpe; Shelley; Shriner; Slupski;
Donald Smith; Tim Smith; Sparrow; Stoiber; Susko; Taylor; Thies; Thome; Truman Thompson; Bernita
Turner; Unruh; Voong; Vu; Wagner; Weathers; Weeden; Weissenfels; Whitesell; Whitlow; Whittaker; Wid-
ner; Willis; Young.
Ssee Antonowsky (one-time income from sale of two pieces of property); Barlett (lump sum distribu-
tion of back child support); Boller (one-time bonus); Catron (proceeds from sale of home); Clark (proceeds
from sale of home); Croft (withdrawals from 40 1(k) account); Demmons (payments from husband to help
pay mortgages on properties she was surrendering); Devenport (proceeds from sale of home); Duffield
(payments under an annuity contract); Faulkner (workers' compensation settlement); Fields (withdrawal
from 401(k) accounts); Gehl (foster child payments); George (proceeds from retroactive pay); Donnell
Green (back overtime pay); Hansen (one-time IRA distribution); Haskins (lump sum retroactive VA bene-
fits); Warren Hunt (proceeds from liquidation of a business); Maguire (withdrawals from retirement ac-
counts); Navejar (one-time retirement account withdrawal); Ransom (distributions from sale of savings
bonds); Richter (withdrawal from value of exempt life insurance policy and an annuity and proceeds from
sale of real estate); Schreiber (proceeds from sale of home); Stern (inheritance); Szekeres (signing bonus); Eric
Thompson (severance and 401(k) proceeds); Michelle Turner (sale of car); Whitney (IRA distributions);
Williams (severance package).
s
5
see Christensen (additional transportation expenses); Corbin (increased child support obligation and
additional family expenses); Gregory Evans (providing support of grandchildren while son was on active
duty); Mary Hinkle (relocation expenses); Imhoff (expenses of replacing vehicles); Pellegrin (replacing home
and belongings destroyed in Hurricane Katrina and related storage and relocation expenses); Pollmann
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The United States trustees have relied on other circumstances in fewer
cases, such as medical conditions,90 divorce or separation, 91 the existence of
assets to be administered in the chapter 7 case,92 or the uncertain outcome of
litigation.93 In some cases, the reasons for the decision were not clearly
identified. 94
In sixty-six cases, or almost 29%, the United States trustees declined to
file dismissal motions in cases converted from a chapter 13 proceeding to a
chapter 7 case.95 In these cases, they rarely noted the conversion from an
unsuccessful chapter 13 as a basis for declining to file a dismissal motion.96 In
only ten cases converted from chapter 13 did the United States trustees file
motions to dismiss based on a presumption of abuse.97 This suggests that the
United States trustee is reluctant to seek dismissal of a chapter 7 case when
the debtor has previously been unsuccessful in completing a chapter 13 plan,
(expenses of replacing vehicle); Pospy (unusually high transportation expenses and expenses associated
with job); Robbins (business expenses necessary to generate business income received during six-month
period used to compute means test); Rupp (debtor was pregnant, which would increase household size and
associated expenses); Schroeder (expenses in connection with replacement vehicle); Sellman (extra nursing
home expenses); Slattery (student loan payments); Weins (additional telecommunications expenses); Willis
(increased household size); Wills (unidentified additional expenses).
9°See Alexander; Berryman; Correll; George-, Gibbs; Haider; Metcalf; Schroeder; Walp. Medical condi-
tions would also necessarily affect future income and expenses.
9iSee Lee Anderson; Randall Anderson; Barnes; Thomas Bryant; Elmore;, Haworth; Jermel Jackson;
Yvette Jones; Lucey; Willie Mitchell; Pickeral; Schievelbein; cf. Metcalf (referring to undescribed "marital
situation). Divorce or separation would necessitate separate living arrangements, which increase
expenses.
95See Amir; Baldwin; Bernardo; Cicalese; Hoffman; Lloyd; Purcell.
9'See Mancini; Mrowczynski.
94See Bjornstad (in which the declination statement is not available on the docket); Bolin (stating,
'Debtors have demonstrated to the United States Trustee that circumstances in this case do not warrant
the filing of a Motion to dismiss" when debtors argued that they would be allowed additional expense
deductions in a chapter 13 case so that presumption would not be triggered); Prater (in which the docket
simply indicates that United States trustee "declines to file a motion to dismiss" and the debtor's affidavit
to rebut the presumption indicated a loss of job and payments towards a non-dischargeable student loan);
Walter (citing "special circumstances"); Wicker (stating "because the United States Trustee does not con-
sider such a motion to be appropriate").
9 5See Alexander; Amir; Lee Anderson; Randall Anderson; Barnes; Bells; Brandon; Braud; Brooks;
Burgmeier; Calhoun; Cast; Cavazos; Cicalese; Cleveland; Corbin; Coulombe;, Dickmann; DiThomas; Drake;,
Durrington; Ferbrache; Ferraro; Gibbs; Guettler; Guidry; Hancock; Imhoff; Ivancic;JoharJohnLewis; Yvette
Jones; Justice; Kalal; Kalata; Kendrck; Kimberlin; Kryza; Kuceris; Lloyd; Mason; McLean; Steven Miller;
Myles; Neuman-Pouncy; Nguyen; Nichols; Niedenmier; Odden; Michael Oliver; Passino; Pickeral; Amy Pol-
lock; Pratt; Reed; Riley; Rodriguez; Rubner; Schievelbein; Senez; Sparrow; Truman Thompson; Bernita Tur-
ner; Weissenfels; Wicker; Willis.
96The court did so in Niedermier.
97See Curtis; Diezi; Heslop; Northcutt; St. Jean; Shaffer; Shahidi; Richard Smith; Steers; Townsend.
This does not include cases in which the debtor originally filed under chapter 7, converted to chapter 13,
and then reconverted to chapter 7. The United States trustees often do not even file a statement of abuse
in those reconverted chapter 7 cases. See, e.g., Acosta; Cox; Davis; Goodall; Sheila Green; Moose, Mortakis;
Oriti; VanMeter. But see Maura (ordering dismissal of original chapter 7 unless the debtor converted the
case to chapter 13, and dismissing the case pursuant to the original order on reconversion to chapter 7).
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often because of a reduction in income or increase in expenses after confirma-
tion of that plan.98 It may also suggest that the existence of the means test is
driving a significant number of debtors into chapter 13 who do not have the
ability to complete a chapter 13 plan and who would have been better off in
chapter 7 from the beginning.
C. ATTEMPTS TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION
In ninety-three (or 23%) of the cases studied, the debtors filed documents
frequently called a "rebuttal of presumption" or "affidavit re: special circum-
stances" or "statement of special circumstances" before the United States
trustee determined whether to file a motion to dismiss, what I will refer to as
a "preemptive rebuttal of presumption."99 In most of those cases, the debtors
filed the documents as part of the first-day filings. 1o In a very few cases, the
debtors filed documents in response to the statements of presumed abuse.101
Shortly after BAPCPA became effective, a few pioneers began filing a
preemptive rebuttal, but this trend did not really catch on until 2012, as the
following chart demonstrates.
9 S5ome scholars have suggested that the means test is not applicable to a debtor who converts his or
her case from one under chapter 13. See Kathleen Murphy & Justin H. Dion, "Means Test" or "Just a
Mean Test": An Examination of the Requirement that Converted Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Debtors Comply
with Amended Section 707(b), 16 ABI L. Rev. 413 (2008). Courts disagree on the issue. Compare In re
Thoemke, No. 9:12-bk-17027-FMD, 2014 WL 443890 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2014); In re Layton, 480
B.R. 392 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012); In re Fox, 370 B.R. 639 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007) (finding § 707(b) inapplica-
ble to converted case) with In re Burgher, 539 BR. 868 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2015); In re Croft, 539 BR. 122
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2015); In re Reece, 498 B.R. 72 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2013) (finding §707(b) applicable to
converted cases).
99See Baker; Beasley; Benson; Bishop; Bolin; Boller; Bradley; Braunreiter; Bray; Chanel Brown; Rose
Brown; Thomas Bryant; Caban; Cali; Carruth; Catron; Colbath; Colucci; Coyle; Curtin; Degree; Devenport;
Diephof; Alice Evans; Fausto; Fields; Ford; Glover, Donnell Green; Haider, Hampton; Harlin; Haskins; Hola-
han; Hull; Angela Jackson; Dwight Johnson; June Jones; Kane; Kirkham; Leary; Lindsay; Long; Maloy; Mar-
bury; Marisay; Maura; Mayo; Mays; McCollum; McNelly;, Meyer, Mielke; Mier; Willie Mitchell;
Montanez; Navejar; Daniel Oliver; Ortego; Ost; Partin; Pasquale; Plotchev; Russell Pollock; Pope; Pospy;
Prater; Robinson; Rogers; Sanford; Sellman; Singletary; Slattery; Slupski; Tim Smith; Sookhram; Speakman;
Stern; Stoltman; Szekeres; Talmadge, Thome; Thorien; Michelle Turner; Voong; Vu; Walp; Weathers; Whit-
low; Whitney; Widner; Willis; Young.
i"°See Baker; Benson; Boller; Braunreiter;, Bray; Chanel Brown; Rose Brown; Thomas Bryant; Caban;
Cali; Carruth; Catron; Colbath; Colucci; Coyle, Curtin; Degree-, Devenport; Diephof; Alice Evans; Fausto;
Fields; Ford; Glover; Donnell Green; Haider, Hampton; Harlin; Haskins; Holahan; Hull; Dwight Johnson;
Kane; Kirkham; Lindsay; Long; Maloy; Marbury; Marisay; Mayo; Mays; McCollum; McNelly; Meyer;
Mielke; Mier; Willie Mitchell; Montanez; Navejar; Ortego; Ost; Partin; Pasquale; Plotchev; Pope; Pospy;
Prater; Robinson; Rogers; Sanford; Sellman; Slattery; Slupski; Tim Smith; Sookhram; Stern; Szekeres; Thome;
Michelle Turner; Voong; Vu; Walp; Weathers; Whitlow; Whitney, Widner, Young; cf. Thorien; Willis (re-
buttal filed on conversion to chapter 7).
i"iSee Beasley; Bishop; Maura; Singletary; Speakman; Stoltman; Talmadge. All of these filings were in
cases in which the United States trustees brought motions to dismiss.
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Number of Cases in which Debtor filed Early Rebuttal of Presumption (by Year)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
0 6 102 1103 3 104 0 1105
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
0 11106 28107 8108 13109 22110
Utilization of the preemptive rebuttal, however, has not yet caught on
nationwide. A review of the sampled cases shows that certain regions see far
more such submissions than others, as the following chart illustrates:
Region 111  Number of Cases in Total Number of Percentage of Cases
Study with Preemp- Cases in Study by by Region with Pre-
tive Rebuttal Filings Region emptive Rebuttal
Filings
1 0 6112 0
2 0 2113 0
3 1114 4115 25%
'°
2 See Daniel Oliver; Singletary; Speak'man; Stoltman; Talmadge; Thorien.
103See Leary.
10
4See Beasley; Bishop, Willis.
''See Maura.
'OsSee Colucci; Ford; Hull, Lindsay; Long; Mielke; Pospy; Slattery; Walp; Whitlow; Young.
1°7See Baker; Benson; Boller; Bradley; Caban; Carruth; Catron; Colbath; Diephof; Haider; Holohan; June
Jones; Maloy; Marisay; Mayo; Mier; Willie Mitchell; Montanez; Navejar, Partin; Pasquale; Plotchev; Russell
Pollock; Rogers; Sanford; Slupski; Michelle Turner; Whitney.
10 See Bolin; Braunreiter; Rose Brown; Degree; Fields; Glover; Meyer; Ortego.
'
0 9See Alice Evans; Harlin; Haskins; Dwight Johnson; Kirkham; McCollum; McNelly; Ost; Pope; Sook-
hran; Stern; Thore; Voong.
'See Bray; Chanel Brown; Thomas Bryant; Cali; Coyle; Curtin; Devenport; Fausto; Donnell Green;
Hampton; Angela Jackson; Kane; Marbury; Mays; Prater; Robinson; Sellman; Tim Smith; Szekeres; Vu;
Weathers; Widner.
"'These are the regions of the United States trustee system, plus Alabama and North Carolina that
use bankruptcy administrators. The twenty-one regions of the United States trustee system are as follows:
Region 1: Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island; Region 2: New York, Connecticut,
and Vermont; Region 3: Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania; Region 4: Maryland, South Carolina,
Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia; Region 5: Louisiana and Mississippi; Region 6: the
Northern and Eastern Districts of Texas; Region 7: the Western and Southern Districts of Texas; Region
8: Tennessee and Kentucky; Region 9: Michigan and Ohio; Region 10: Indiana and the Central and
Southern Districts of Illinois; Region 11: the Northern District of Illinois and Wisconsin; Region 12:
Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota; Region 13: Arkansas, Missouri, and Nebraska; Re-
gion 14: Arizona; Region 15: the Southern District of California, Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mari-
ana Islands; Region 16: the Central District of California; Region 17: the Eastern and Northern Districts
of California and Nevada; Region 18: Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington; Region 19:
Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming; Region 20: Kansas, New Mexico, and Oklahoma; Region 21: Georgia,
Florida, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
"'See Coulombe; Conovan; Green; Kueris; Pratt; Purcell.
..
3 See George; Maguire.
114See Talmadge.
iiSSee Cicalese; Fonsah; Lenton; Talmadge.
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4 111 6 15117 6.67%
5 0 10118 0
6 0 3119 0
7 19120 24121 79.17%
8 5122 15123 33.33%
9 15124 71125 21.13%
10 3126 26127 11.54%
11 18128 27129 66.67%
12 1130 16131 6.25%
13 9132 17133 52.94%
14 0 1 3j 134 0
"'
6 See Walp.
117See Acosta; Croft; Groves; Holliday; Jackson; McCain; Meade; Niles; Olson; Pickeral; Rongione; Ron-
ald Sharpe; Vidas; Walp; Whittaker.
"'See Guidry; Johar, John-Lewis; Lustick; Patrick; Pellegrin; Schmolke; Senez; Smith; Walter.
"
9See Barraza; Camp; Susko.
120See Caban; Carruth; Colbath; Diephof, Holahan; Leary; Long; Malay; Marisay; Mays; Meyer;
Navejar; Daniel Oliver; Ost; Partin; Sellman; Singletary; Weathers; Whitney.
'
21See Antonowsky; Caban; Carruth; Cavazos; Colbath; Diephof; Holahan; Leary; Long; Malay;
Marisay; Mays; Meyer; Navejar; Daniel Oliver; Ost; Partin; Samaro; Schreiber; Sellman; Singletary; Town
send; Weathers; Whitney.
122See Baker; Bishop; Catron; Fields; Russell Pollock.123See Baker, Bell; Bishop; Catron; Clinton; Correll; Fields; Fletcher, Gibbs; Kendrick; Mitchell; Pearce;,
Russell Pollock; Riley; Weeden.
.
24See Colucci; Coyle; Degree, Alice Evans; Harlin; Maura; Mayo; Pasquale; Plotchev; Pope; Pospy;
Slattery; Speakman; Whitlow; Young.
2
'See Altaffer; Amir; Barrett; Bearshak; Bells; Boyd; Brandon; Branscom; Burgmeier; Byers; Calhoun;
Castle; Colucci; Conroy; Cox; Coyle; Curtis; Davis; Degree;, Alice Evans; Ferbrache; Fudge; Gordan-Dickson;
Grabarczyk; Harlin; Harper; Heslop; Hinkle; Imhoff; Ivancic; Jennings; Jones; Justice; Kalal; Kimberlin;
Maertens; Mancini; Mason; Maura; Mayo; McCarville; McKay-Polly; Linda Miller, Steven Miller;
Mrowczynski; Neubert; Niedermier; Oriti; Pasquale;, Plotchev; Pope; Pospy; Rapp; Roman; Schwin; Sekardi;
Simmons; Slattery; Smith; Sparrow; Speakman; Spearman; Stoiber; Thompson; Tomlinson; Turner; Weinert;
Whitlow; Williams; Wiseman; Young.
"s6See Benson; Bolin; Glover.
is7See Benson; Bolin; Chamness; Courtney; Elmore; Evans; Glover; Grinkmeyer; Hunt; Jermel Jackson;
Jessup; Dwayne Johnson; Johnston; Manley, McCullough; McKee; Millikan; Pollmann; Richter; Roberts;
Singer; Thompson; VanMeter; Whitesell; Wills; Wise.
i28See Braunreiter; Chanel Brown; Rose Brown; Cali; Curtin; Haider; Hampton; Angela Jackson; June
Jones; Kane; Marbury;, McCollum; Mielke; Montanez; Ortego; Robinson; Szekeres; Widner.
129See Bjornstad; Braunreiter; Chanel Brown; Rose Brown; Cali; Crego; Curtin; Haider; Hampton; An-
gela Jackson; Nancy Johnson; June Jones; Kalata; Kane; Krahn; Lucey; Marbury; McCollum; Mielke;
Montanez; Mortakis; Ortego; Robinson; Rodgers; Szekeres; Thies; Widner.
iOSee Stoltman.
i"iSee Allison; Anderson; Braathun; Bushinski; Erickson; Gehl; Goodall; Masur; Neibauer; Reed; Rieck I;
Rieck II; Schievelbein; Stoltman; Unruh; Weins.132See Boller; Hull; Dwight Johnson; Willie Mitchell; Prater; Rogers; Sanford; Michelle Turner; Willis.
i13See Boatright; Boller; Crow; Dowl; Hull; Dwight Johnson; Willie Mitchell; Nichols; Prater;, Rogers;
Ryader; Sanford; Skaggs; Swanson; Michelle Turner; Willis; Wright.
"4Sa Barker; Cast; Cherniak; Hartley; Hitchcock; Hutchinson; Lull; McMillan; Metcalf; Neuman-
Pouncy; Shelley; Springer; Sterkel.
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15 0 3135 0
16 3136 11137 27.27%
17 1138 12139 8.33%
18 12140 45141 26.67%
19 1142 18143 5.56%
20 3144 19145 15.79%
21 0 29146 0
Ala. 1147 3148 33.33%
N.C. 0 7149 0
To analyze whether filing the preemptive rebuttal had any impact on the
decision of the United States trustee to file a dismissal motion, I looked for
cases in which the debtors filed a preemptive rebuttal but the United States
trustee nevertheless filed a dismissal motion. I found only eighteen cases'
50
(i.e., 19%). These eighteen cases included nine cases in which the debtors did
not file the rebuttals until after the United States trustees had filed a state-
ment of presumed abuse.' 51 In four of the eighteen cases, the trustees' mo-
tions were subsequently withdrawn based on the same grounds they used to
1'5See Thomas Evans; Maya; McCollough-Bushey.
136See Ford; Mier; Slupski.
137See Alexander; Chan; Ford; Katz; Koupal; Mier; Moranz; Renteria; Slupski; Richard Smith; Wilkins.
138 ee Lindsay.
139See Brand; Braud; Corpus; DiThomas; Enriquez; Escano; Hodson; Lindsay; Lunn; Nebres; Truman
Thompson; Vanek.
14°See Beasley; Bray; Thomas Bryant; Devenport; Fausto; Haskins; Kirkham; Sookhram; Stern; Thorien;
Voong; Vu.
'
41 See Albrecht; Allen; Lee Anderson; Baldwin; Barber, Barnes; Beasley; Bray; Brooks; Thomas Bryant;
Corbin; Coverstone; Devenport; Dickmann; Durrington; Faulkner, Fausto; Habets; Hancock; Hartley; Has-
kins; Haworth; Hickman; Hoffman; Holliday; Kirkham; Knepper; McCaulley; McLean; Guy Miller,
Northcutt; Odden; Oliver, Robbins; Schroeder, Sharp; Shriner; Sookhram; Stern; Thorien; Uder Lopez;
Voong; Vu; Wagner, Weissenfels.
'
42 See Tim Smith.
'
3 See Berryman; Branscome, Brosius; Champine; Christensen; Colbert; Duffin; Hansen; Hinkle; Hunt;
Merino; Vede Miller, Ransom; James Roberts; Shaffer, Tim Smith; Weber; Woods.
14'See Donnell Green; McNelly;, Thome.
'
45See Barlett; Buford; Champagne; Clark; Cleveland; Close; Collins; Donovan; Fitting; Donnell Green;
Harris; Jadhav; Jaramillo; Johns, Makres; McNelly, Rupp; Taylor; Thome.
146See Banks James; Demmons; Diezi; Drake, Duffield; Ferraro; Foster, Guettler; Haddock; Holmes;
Kryza; Labruno; Lloyd; Mancera; Milton; Myles; Nguyen; Passino; Amy Pollock; Rey; Rodriguez; Rubner; St.
Jean; Shahidi; Anthony Sharpe', Douglas Smith; Starnes; Steers, Wicker.
147See Bradley.
148See Bradley; Edwards; Sanders.
'
49See Bernardo; Krawczyk; Moose;, Parker, Carrie Smith; Sterrenberg; Thelen.
'See Beasley; Bishop; Bradley; Degree, Hampton; Harlin; Hull; Leary; Maura; Daniel Oliver Plotchev;
Russell Pollock; Singletary; Sookhram; Speakman; Stoltman; Talmadge; Thorien.
'
1 5See Beasley; Bishop; Leary; Maura; Singletary; Speakman; Stoltman; Talmadge; Thorien.
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decline filing in the first instance.152  In one other case, the court denied the
motion.153 This means that the United States trustees did not move to dis-
miss in seventy-five of the ninety-three cases in which preemptive rebuttals
were filed, or 81%, and the debtors were ultimately able to remain in chapter
7 in eighty of the ninety-three cases, or 87%. 15 4
By comparison, in the 302 cases in which the debtors did not file preemp-
tive rebuttals, the United States trustees filed dismissal motions based on the
presumption of abuse in 150 cases, or about 50% of the cases.15 5 The trust-
ees withdrew (or did not pursue) the motions in forty-four cases,' 56 often for
reasons that would have justified decisions to decline filing motions in the
first place.' 57 In twenty-three cases, the motions were denied.'5 8 Therefore,
152See Hampton (debtor's non-filing spouse moved out); Russell Pollock (debtor was unemployed);
Speakman (debtor had insufficient disposable income to fund chapter 13 plan); Stoltman (debtor had no
disposable income).
"'sSee Bradley.
'
5 4Notably, the cases in which the United States trustees filed motions to dismiss despite the debtors
having filed rebuttals of presumption include all those filed in 2006 and 2007, and ten of the eleven filed
before 2012. In seventy-four of the eighty-one cases filed since 2012, the United States trustees declined
to file motions to dismiss (and withdrew the motions in two of the cases in which motions were filed),
meaning that the debtors were able to remain in chapter 7 in seventy-six of those eighty-one cases (94%).
15iSee Acosta; Albrecht; Allen; Allison; Banks James; Barber, Barker; Barraza; Barrett; Bearshak; Bell;
Boatright; Braathun; Brosius; Bushinski; Camp; Castle; Chamness; Champagne; Champine-, Chan; Chemiak;
Clinton; Close; Courtney; Coverstone;, Cox; Crego; Curtis; Davis; Diezi; Connie Donovan; Joseph Donovan;
Edwards; Enriquez; Erickson; Escano; Thomas Evans; Fletcher; Fonash; Foster; Fudge; Goodall; Grabarczyk;
Sheila Green; Grinkmeyer;, Groves; Haddock; Harper, Harris; Jammie Hartley; Steven Hartley;, Heslop; Hick-
man; Vernon Hinkle; Hitchcock; Hodson; Holliday; Holmes; Josephine Hunt; Hutchinson; Harold Jackson;
Jadhav; Jaramillo; Jennings; Jessup; Johns; Dwayne Johnson; Katz; Knepper; Krahn; Krawczyk; Labruno;
Lenton; Lunn; Maertens; Makres; Mancera; Manley; Masur, Maya; McCain; McCarville; McKay-Polly;
McMillan; Meade;, Merino; Guy Miller; Linda Miller; Vede Miller, Millikan; Milton; Carrie Mitchell;
Moose; Moranz; Mortakis; Nebres; Nichols; Niles; Northcutt; Olson; Oriti; Parker; Patrick; Pearce; Rapp;
Renteria; Rey; Rieck I; Rieck II; Roman; Rongione; Ryder; St. Jean; Samaro; Sanders; Sekardi; Senez; Shaffer,
Shahidi; Ronald Sharpe; Simmons; Singer, Skaggs; Carrie Smith; Douglas Smith; Louie Smith; Richard
Smith; Spearman; Springer; Steers; Sterkel; Sterrenberg; Swanson; Thelen; Gregory Thompson; Tomlinson;
Townsend; Uder Lopez; Vanek; VanMeter, Vidis; Weber, Weinert; Wilkins; Willis; Wise, Wiseman; Woods;
Wright. These do not include cases in which the debtors converted to chapter 13 or chapter 11 after filing
the statements of presumed abuse but before motions to dismiss were filed. InWillis, the debtor did not
file a rebuttal the first time his chapter 13 case was converted to chapter 7, and the United States trustee
filed a motion to dismiss, but the second time the debtor converted his chapter 13 case to chapter 7, he
filed a rebuttal, and the trustee did not file a motion to dismiss. In Nichols, the United States trustee
brought a motion to dismiss the first time the case was converted from chapter 13 to chapter 7 but
declined the second time. The debtor never filed a rebuttal.
i"'See Allison; Barber; Barker Bearshak; Bell, Brosius; Bushinski; Chamness; Clinton; Grabarczyk; Had-
dock; Harlin; Harper; Jammie Hartley; Steven Hartley; Heslop; Vernon Hinkle;, Hitchcock; Holmes; Jadhav;
Dwayne Johnson; Knepper; Krahn; Maertens; Mancera; Manley;, Masur; McCarville; Meade; Merino; Guy
Miller; Millikan; Milton; Plotchev; Rapp; Samaro; Sekardi; Spearman; Springer; Sterkel; Tomlinson; Weber;
Wiseman; Woods. The United States trustees withdrew the motions in Millikan and Masur after they
were granted and affirmed on appeal.
157See, e.g., Allison (additional expenses for older vehicles); Barker (assets available for distribution);
Bearshak (reduction in income); Bell (assets available to administer); Brosius (debtor and spouse divorcing);
Bushinski (one-time bonus prior to filing); Chamness (available assets for distribution); Clinton (assets
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the debtors were able to remain in chapter 7 in 219 of the 302 cases (or
73%), despite not filing a preemptive rebuttal. But compared to the 81% rate
when debtors filed a presumptive rebuttal, a debtor's chance of remaining in
chapter 7 despite the presumption of abuse arising is significantly enhanced
by filing a preemptive rebuttal.
D. WHEN AND WHERE THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEES DECLINE TO
BRING MOTIONS
The cases chosen for the study were not selected based on any factor
other than the month in which they were filed, so I first decided to sort them
by year to see if there were any trends. The results follow:
Filing Year Cases in which Cases in which Total Cases Percentage of
Motions to Dis- U.S. Trustee Cases in which
miss Were Filed Declined to File Motions to Dis-
Motion to Dis- miss Were Filed
miss
2005 4159 9160 13 30.77%
2006 28161 8162 36 77.78%
2007 47163 38164 85 55.29%
available for distribution); Haddock (decline in income); Harper (current residential, marital and financial
circumstances); Heslop (loss of income); Vernon Hinkle (medical condition resulting in decreased income);
McCarville (pending dissolution of marriage, and existence of assets to administer); Mancera (loss of in-
come); Manley (one-time receipt of bonus); Masur (loss of income); Merino (income is below amount
triggering presumption); Guy Miller (loss of income); Rapp (assets to administer); Samaro (available assets
to distribute); Sekardi (available assets to distribute); Spearman (available assets to administer); Sterkel (no
disposable income); Tomlinson (assets available for administration); Weber (based on severe medical
problems impairing ability to secure future employment); Woods (debtor changed jobs to new location,
needs two residences until house sold).
"'See Boatright; Braathun; Close; Thomas Evans; Foster; Holliday; Josephine Hunt; Hutchinson; Harold
Jackson; Jessup; Labruno; Makres; Nebres; Parker; Rongione; Sanders; Ronald Sharpe; Simmons; Carrie
Smith; Louie Smith; Thelen; Gregory Thompson; Wilkins.
i"9See Allison; Harris; Johns; Simmons.
i6°See Branscom; Buford; Christensen; Cicalese; Colbert; Imhoff; Lloyd; Lustick; Pellegrin.
16See Acosta; Barraza; Bell; Castle; Close; Curtis; Connie Donovan; Erickson; Vernon Hinkle; Hitch-
cock; Lenton; McCarville; Guy Miller; Linda Miller; Daniel Oliver, Renteria; Samaro; Singletary; Skaggs;
Louie Smith; Speakman; Steers; Stoltman; Talmadge; Gregory Thompson; Thorien; Townsend; Weber.
161See Hansen; Justice; Kendrick, Lull; Michael Oliver; Pollmann; Schreiber; Bernita Turner.
i6'See Banks James; Barber; Barrett; Bearshak; Bishop; Braathun; Brosius; Chamness; Champagne;
Champine; Cherniak; Courtney; Crego; Goodall; Sheila Green; Hickman; Holmes; Hutchinson; Jadhav; Jen-
nings; Dwayne Johnson; Knepper; Krahn; Leary; Maertens; Makres; Mancera; Masur Maya; Merino; Mil-
likan; Milton; Moranz; Nichols; Northcutt; Oriti; Rapp; Roman; Ryder; Senez; Shaffer; Singer; Richard
Smith; Uder Lopez; Wilkins; Wise-man; Woods.
"S4See Lee Anderson; Antonowsky; Barlett; Bjornstad; Burgmeier; Byers; Cleveland; Collins; Conroy;
Corbin; Correll; Demmons; Dowl; Duffield; Gregory Evans; George; Guettler; Habets; John-Lewis; Johnston;
Kalata; Maguire; Steven Miller; Nguyen; Nichols; Pratt; Purcell; Ransom; Rupp; Schmolke; Senez; Starnes;
Eric Thompson; Wagner; Weins; Whitesell; Whittaker; Williams.
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2008 43165 65166 108 39.81%
2009 6167 18168 24 25%
2010 11169 1170 12 91.67%
2011 8171 4172 12 66.67%
2012 8173 16174 24 33.33%
2013 6175 27176 33 18.18%
2014 2177 11178 13 15.38%
2015 4179 12180 16 25%
2016 1181 21182 22 4.76%
Total 168 230 398 42.21%
Looking at the data in a graphic form, one can see a strong pattern. In the
first six or seven years after the effective date of BAPCPA, United States
165See Albrecht; Allen; Barker; Beasley; Boatright; Bushinski; Camp; Clinton; Cox; Davis; Diezi; Joseph
Donovan; Escano; Fonash; Foster; Haddock; Harper, Steven Hartley; Heslop; Holliday; Josephine Hunt; Har-
old Jackson; Jessup; Labruno; Manley; McCain; McMillan; Meade; Mortakis; Nebres; Parker; Rongione;
Sekardi; Ronald Sharpe; Carrie Smith; Spearman; Springer; Sterkel; Swanson; Tomlinson; VanMeter; Vidis;
Willis.
166See Alexander; Altaffer, Amir; Bernardo; Beryman; Boyd; Brand; Branscome, Cavazos; Clark; Corpus;
Croft; DiThomas; Durrington; Elmore; Faulkner; Ferbrache; Fitting; Gehl; Gibbs; Guidry; Haworth; Mary
Hinkle; Hoffman; Warren Hunt; Jennel Jackson; Johar; Yvette Jones; Kalal; Kimberlin; Kryza; Lucey; Man-
cini; Mason; McCaulley; McCullough; McKee; McLean; Metcalf; Mrowcznski; Myles; Neibauer; Neubert;
Neuman-Pouncy; Passino; Pickeral; Amy Pollock; Richter; Riley; James Roberts; Ralph Roberts; Rodriguez;
Rubner; Schievelbein; Schroeder, Schwin; Sharp; Anthony Sharpe; Sparrow; Stoiber; Taylor; Truman
Thompson; Walter, Willis; Wills.
167See Coverstone; Groves; Rieck I; St. Jean; Shahidi; Thelen.
16Ssee Randall Anderson; Barnes; Bells; Brandon; Braud; Brooks; Calhoun; Coulombe; Dickmann; Duffin;
Hancock; Ivancic; Odden; Rodgers; Shelley; Shriner; Weissenfels; Wicker.
169See Chan; Enriquez; Fletcher, Grabarczyk; Grinkmeyer; Hodson; Katz; Lunn; Maura; Sanders; Wise.
17
°See Reed.
17iSee Thomas Evans; Krawczyk; Moose; Rieck II; Douglas Smith; Sterrenberg; Vanek; Weinert.
i7 1See Cast; Ferraro; McCollough-Bushey; Susko.
173See Edwards; Hull; McKay-Polly; Niles; Olson; Pearce; Rey; Wright.
i74See Baldwin; Colucci; Drake; Ford; Koupal; Lindsay; Long; Mielke; Niedermier; Pospy; Robbins; Slat-
tery; Thies; Walp; Whitlow; Young.
i75See Bradley; Jammie Hartley; Jaramillo; Vede Miller; Plotchev; Russell Pollock.
176See Baker;, Benson; Boller; Caban; Carruth; Catron; Colbath; Diephof; Haider; Holahan; June Jones;
Kuceris; Maloy; Marisay; Mayo; Mier; Willie Mitchell; Montanez; Navejar; Partin; Pasquale; Rogers; San-
ford; Slupski; Donald Smith; Michelle Turner; Whitney.
i7 7See Degree; Patrick.
i7 SSee Bolin; Braunreiter, Rose Brown; Crow; Fields; Glover; Gordan-Dickson; Meyer; Ortego; Unruh;
Weeden.
179See Fudge-, Harlin; Carrie Mitchell; Sookhram.
'
8
ssee Alice Evans; Haskins; Dwight Johnson; Nancy Johnson; Kirkham; McCollum; McNelly; Ost;
Pope; Stern; Thome; Voong.
'
8
sSee Hampton.
18SSee Bray; Chanel Brown; Thomas Bryant; Cali; Coyle; Curtin; Devenport; Fausto; Donnell Green;
Angela Jackson; Kane; Marbury; Mays; Prater; Robinson; Sellman; Tim Smith; Szekeres; Vu; Weathers;
Widner.
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trustees tended to bring more motions to dismiss cases filed by above-median
debtors (reaching a height of almost 90% in 2010). Since 2013, United States
trustees have generally become more likely to decline to file a motion to dis-
miss. One can also see that the total number of cases in which the United
States trustee was forced to make any decision under § 704(b)(2) has de-
clined dramatically since 2008, which suggests that fewer above-median debt-
ors are filing bankruptcy cases under chapter 7.
Decision by U.S. Trustee under Section 704(b)(2) by Year
10o
40
20
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
-Motion to Dismiss -Decline to Bring Motion -Percentage of Motions to Dismiss -Total Cases
In reviewing the same data by regions of the United States Trustee pro-
gram (or the districts with bankruptcy administrators), additional patterns
emerge.
Region Cases in which Cases in which Total Cases Ratio of Motions
Motions to Dis- U.S. Trustee to Dismiss to
miss were Filed Declined to file Total Cases
Motion to Dis-
miss
1 2183 4184 6 33.33%
2 0 2185 2 0
3 3186 1187 4 7596
4 11188 4189 15 73.33%
1
8 3See Joseph Donovan; Sheila Green.
18
4See Coulombe;, Kuceris; Pratt; Purcell.
185See George; Maguire.
5
s
6See Fonash; Lenton; Talmadge.
1S7See Cicalese.
'8sSee Acosta; Groves; Holliday; Harold Jackson; McCain; Meade, Niles Olson; Rongione; Ronald
Sharpe; Vidis.
's
9See Croft; Pickeral; Walp; Whittaker.
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5 2190 9191 11 18.18%
6 2192 1193 3 66.67%
7 5194 19195 24 20.83%
8 7196 8197 15 46.67%
9 32198 38199 70 45.71%
10 11200 15201 26 42.31%
11 4202 23203 27 14.81%
12 9204 7205 16 56.25%
13 8206 11207 19 42.11%
14 8208 5209 13 61.54%
15 2210 1211 3 66.67%
16 6212 5213 11 54.55%
"9See Patrick; Senez.
19 1See Guidry; Johar; John-Lewis; Lustick; Pellegrin; Schmolke; Senez; Donald Smith; Walter.
'
92See Barraza; Camp.
1
'9See Susko.
i94See Leary; Daniel Oliver, Samaro; Singletary;, Townsend.
19 5See Antonowsky; Caban; Carruth; Cavazos; Colbath; Diephof; Holahan; Long; Maloy; Marisay;
Mays; Meyer; Navejar; Ost; Partin; Schreiber; Sellman, Weathers; Whitney.
196See Bell; Bishop; Clinton; Fletcher; Carrie Mitchell; Pearce; Russell Pollock.
'
97See Baker, Catron; Correll; Fields; Gibbs; Kendrick; Riley; Weeden.
198See Barrett; Bearshak; Castle; Cox; Curtis; Davis; Degree, Fudge; Grabarczyk; Harlin; Harper, Heslop;
Vernon Hinkle, Jennings; Maertens; Maura; McCarville; McKay-Polly; Linda Miller; Oriti; Plotchev; Rapp;
Roman; Sekaradi; Simmons; Louie Smith; Speakman; Spearman; Gregory Thompson; Tomlinson; Weinert;
Wiseman.
it9See Altaffer, Amir, Bells; Boyd; Brandon; Branscom; Burgmeier; Byers; Calhoun; Colucci; Conroy;
Coyle; Alice Evans; Ferbrache; Gordan-Dickson; Imhoff; Ivancic; Yvette Jones; Justice; Kalal; Kimberlin;
Mancini; Mason; Mayo; Steven Miller;, Mrowczynski; Neubert; Niedermier; Pasquale; Pope; Pospy; Schwin;
Slattery; Sparrow; Stoiber; Bernita Turner; Whitlow; Williams.
'See Chamness; Courtney; Grinkmeyer; Josephine Hunt; Jessup; Dwayne Johnson; Manley; Millikan;
Singer;, VanMeter; Wise.
"°iSee Benson; Bolin; Elmore-, Gregory Evans; Glover; Jermel Jackson; Johnston; McCullough; McKee;
Pollmann; Richter; Ralph Roberts; Eric Thompson; Whitesell; Wills.
S2 ee Crego, Hampton; Krahn; Mortakis.
"°See Bjornstad; Braunreiter; Chanel Brown; Rose Brown; Cali; Curtin; Haider; Angela Jackson; Nancy
Johnson; June Jones;, Kalata; Kane; Lucey; Marbury; McCollum; Mielke; Montanez; Ortego; Robinson; Rod-
gers; Szekeres; Thies; Widner.
"4See Allison; Braathun; Bushinski; Erickson; Goodall; Masur; Rieck I; Rieck II; Stoltman.
2
.See Randall Anderson; Gehl; Neibauer, Reed; Schievelbein; Unruh; Weins.
sSee Boatright; Hull; Nichols; Ryder; Skaggs; Swanson; Willis; Wright.
2°7See Boller; Crow; Dowl; Dwight Johnson; Willie Mitchell; Nichols; Prater, Rogers; Sanford; Michelle
Turner, Willis.
20 8See Barker;, Cherniak; Steven Hartley; Hitchcock; Hutchinson; McMillan; Springer; Sterkel.
"°See Cast; Lull; Metcalf; Neuman-Pouney; Shelley.
"iOSee Thomas Evans; Maya.
"'iSee McCollough-Bus hey.
"i'See Chan; Katz; Moranz; Renteria; Richard Smith; Wilkins.
"'sSee Alexander; Ford; Koupal; Mier; Slupski.
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17 6214 6215 12 50%
18 13216 31217 44 29.55%
19 7218 11219 18 38.89%
20 8220 11221 19 42.11%
21 13222 16223 29 44.83%
Ala. B.A. 3224 0 3 100%
N.C. B.A. 6225 1226 7 85.71%
Total 168 230 398 42.21%
This regional breakdown reflects a dramatic difference from one region to
another, but it does not necessarily explain the differences. There is no corre-
lation between regions which have a relatively large number of nonbusiness
chapter 7 cases and the likelihood that the United States trustee in that
region will file a dismissal motion. For example, Region 9 (Michigan and
Ohio) has far more of these cases than any other region,227 and yet its per-
centage of dismissal motions is lower than 50%. The rate of motions to dis-
miss does not vary significantly between regions with a comparatively
moderate number of above-median debtor chapter 7 cases (i.e., Regions 7, 10,
214See Enriquez; Escano; Hodson; Lunn; Nebres; Vanek.
25"See Brand; Braud; Corpus; DiThomas; Lindsay; Truman Thompson.216See Albrecht; Allen; Barber; Beasley; Coverstone; jammie Hartley; Hickman; Knepper; Guy Miller;
Northcutt; Sookhram; Thorien; Uder Lopez.2
'7See Lee Anderson; Baldwin; Barnes; Bray; Brooks; Thomas Bryant; Corbin; Devenport; Dickmann;
Durrington; Faulkner; Fausto; Habets; Hancock; Haskins; Haworth; Hoffman; Kirkham; MCaulley; Mc.
Lean; Odden; Michael Oliver; Robbins; Schroeder; Sharp; Shriner, Stern; Voong; Vu; Wagner; Weissenfels.21
8See Brosius; Champine; Merino; Vede Miller; Shaffer; Weber; Woods.
219See Berryman; Branscome; Christensen; Colbert; Duffin; Hansen; Mary Hinkle; Warren Hunt; Ran-
som; James Roberts; Tim Smith.2
"°See Champagne; Close; Connie Donovan; Hams; Jadhav; Jaramillo; Johns; Makres.
22iSee Barlett; Buford; Clark; Cleveland; Collins; Fitting, Donnell Green; McNelly; Rupp; Taylor,
Thome.222See Banks James; Diezi; Foster;, Haddock; Holmes; Labruno; Mancera; Milton; Rey; St. Jean; Shahidi;
Douglas Smith; Steers.
22See Demmons; Drake, Duffield; Ferraro; Guettler, Kryza; Lloyd; Myles; Nguyen; Passino; Amy Pollock,
Rodriguez; Rubner; Anthony Sharpe-, Starnes Wicker.224See Bradley; Edwards; Sanders.225See Krawczyk; Moose; Parker, Carrie Smith; Sterrenberg; Thelen.226See Bernardo.
227The statistics for cases included in the study are representative of filing rates in the various regions.
For the twelve-month period ended December 31, 2016, total nonbusiness chapter 7 filings for each of the
regions were as follows: Region 1: 9666; Region 2: 25,897; Region 3: 29,832; Region 4: 30,003; Region
5: 8944; Region 6: 6205; Region 7: 6372; Region 8: 23,991; Region 9: 50,761; Region 10: 22,835;
Region 11: 35,824; Region 12: 12,955; Region 13: 19,205; Region 14: 12,381; Region 15: 7228; Region
16: 29,083; Region 17: 22,959; Region 18: 23,303; Region 19: 17,468; Region 20: 13,954; Region 21:
51,392; North Carolina: 5753; Alabama: 9321. Table F-2, U.S. Bankruptcy Courts - Business and Non-
business Cases Commenced by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, During the 12-Month Period Ending
December 31, 2016, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/f-2/bankruptcy-fiings/2016/12/31.
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11, and 21) from the rate in Region 9, with its significantly higher number of
such cases. Nor is there any apparent correlation between the regions with
similar lower total numbers of cases in the study. For those regions with
fewer than ten cases in the study (i.e., Regions 1, 2, 3, 6, 15, and Alabama and
North Carolina), the range of percentages varies widely from a low of 0% to
a high of 100%.
There also appears to be no correlation between regions in which most
consumer bankruptcy filings are made under chapter 13 and the rate at which
the United States trustee brings motions to dismiss in above-median chapter
7 cases. For example, chapter 13 is the preferred bankruptcy chapter in Re-
gions 5, 6, and 7 (all in the Fifth Circuit),228 yet Regions 5 (Louisiana and
Mississippi) and 7 (the Western and Southern Districts of Texas) have very
low rates of dismissal motions, while Region 6 (the Northern and Eastern
Districts of Texas) has a high rate. Alabama and North Carolina have rela-
tively low rates of consumer chapter 7 filings because most consumer bank-
ruptcy filings in those states are made under chapter 13,229 but they have a
very high rate of motions to dismiss.
In thirteen regions (out of twenty-three, including the two administered
by bankruptcy administrators), an above-median debtor is more likely to re-
main in chapter 7 without facing a motion to dismiss. The difference is most
pronounced in four regions in which the statistics reveal that it is very likely
that an above-median debtor will not face a motion to dismiss for abuse -
Regions 1, 5, 7, and 11, where four times as many cases produced declination
statements than dismissal motions.
In only nine regions is a motion to dismiss more likely than not (Regions
3, 4, 6, 12, 14, 15, 16, and Alabama and North Carolina). The United States
trustees in Regions 3 and 4 and the bankruptcy administrators in Alabama
and North Carolina seem the least willing to exercise their discretion to per-
mit an above-median debtor to remain in chapter 7. Finally, in Region 17, the
United States trustee was equally likely to bring motions to dismiss and file
statements declining to bring a motion to dismiss.
228For the twelve-month period ended December 31, 2016, total nonbusiness bankruptcy filings in the
Fifth Circuit were 55,622, of which 34,057 were made under chapter 13. See Table F-2, supra note 227.
229For example, for the twelve-month period ended December 31, 2016, districts in North Carolina
had 5,759 nonbusiness filings under chapter 7, as compared to 8,685 filings under chapter 13. See id.
Similarly, for the same period, districts in Alabama had 9,321 nonbusiness chapter 7 filings, as compared to
16,673 chapter 13 filings. Id.
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III. CONCLUSION
This study has demonstrated that the United States trustees are making
use of their discretion under § 704(b)(2) to provide relief from (and some
might say to circumvent) the means test of § 707(b)(2), which imposes a
strict mathematical test to determine whether a debtor is abusing the bank-
ruptcy system by filing under chapter 7 rather than chapter 13. That mathe-
matical test is based on a definition of "current monthly income," which in
many cases has no relationship to the actual income available to a debtor to
satisfy creditor claims. In the past, bankruptcy judges took into consideration
in deciding whether to dismiss a chapter 7 case for abuse whether the debtor
could actually fund a meaningful repayment plan in chapter 13. But the
means test was designed to limit the discretion of the bankruptcy judges in
making that decision.
What Congress failed to grasp during the drafting process for BAPCPA
is that it was not removing all discretion. It only shifted the exercise of that
discretion from bankruptcy judges to the United States trustees. Whether
the United States trustees are exercising that discretion differently from the
bankruptcy judges is beyond the scope of this study. It may also be undis-
cernible due to the Department of Justice's refusal to reveal its internal crite-
ria. In any event, the moral of this study is that chapter 7 remains open to
above-median debtors who can explain to the United States trustees why the
results of the means test do not accurately reflect their ability to repay un-
secured creditors under a chapter 13 plan.
It is also clear that the above-median debtors should proactively attempt
to provide that explanation. Whether or not debtor's counsel uses the Best
Case Bankruptcy software for preparing chapter 7 petitions, which includes a
(Vol. 92520
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preemptive rebuttal filing, counsel representing above-median debtors are
well-advised to file preemptive rebuttals, even if the rebuttal fails to satisfy
the standards for rebutting the presumption of abuse once a motion is before
the bankruptcy court. This is not to suggest that the United States trustees
are unable to elicit similar information from the schedules and from Official
Form 122A-2, which form now includes an area for explanation of "special
circumstances that justify additional expenses or adjustments of current
monthly income for which there is no reasonable alternative." However, as
previously discussed, in seventy-four of the ninety-three cases in this study in
which the above-median debtor filed a preemptive rebuttal of presumption,
i.e., 81%, the United States trustees declined to file dismissal motions,230 de-
spite filing an initial notice of presumed abuse. When the debtors did not file
a preemptive rebuttal, the United States trustees declined to file dismissal
motions in only 50% of the cases.23 ' Therefore, all above-median chapter 7
debtors who have any credible argument for remaining in chapter 7 should
file such a rebuttal document. The odds are greatly in their favor.
23See supra text accompanying note 154. Indeed, in many cases in which abovemedian debtors filed
documents to rebut the presumption before the United States trustees were required to file statements of
presumed abuse under 11 U.S.C. § 704(b)(1), the trustees never even filed such a statement. See, e.g., In re
Kikos, No. 16-34846 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2016); In re Gonio, No. 16-34824 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Oct. 31,
2016); In re Moreno, No. 16-34739 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2016); In re McNamara, No. 16-31107
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2016); In re Barrass, No. 15-30352 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Aug. 26, 2015); In re Grey,
No. 15-12570 (Bankr. E.D. Va. July 24, 2015); In re Frazier, No. 15-11827 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2015);
In re Harper, No. 13-41414 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Apr. 19, 2013); In re Kraft, No. 13-24270 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.
Apr. 9, 2013); In re Ngo, No. 13-10825 (Bankr. E.D. La. Mar. 31, 2013); In re Brown, No. 13-13934
(Bankr. D. Md. Mar. 7, 2013); In re Starr, No. 12-21992 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Feb. 23, 2012); In re Arm-
strong, No. 12-12419 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012); In re Aguilar, No. 11-62784 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Dec.
30, 2011); In re Chavolla, No. 11-47698 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2011). The rebuttal document is not
always so successful. In one case, In re Bradley, No. 13-01390 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Apr. 24, 2013), although
the United States trustee did not file a statement under § 704(b)(1), the trustee filed a motion to dismiss
(ECF No. 18, filed July 11, 2013) after the above-median debtor filed a rebuttal of presumption (ECF No.
6, filed April 24, 2013). The court, however, denied the trustee's motion to dismiss. Order Denying
Trustee's Motion to Dismiss Chapter 7 Case Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707(B)(2), id. (Aug. 30, 2013), ECF
No. 31.
231See supra text accompanying note 155.
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